Major Findings –

The Journey to Higher Education

The study points out that despite an increase in the rate of college students of Ethiopian origin, their representation in institutions of higher education is still lower than their representation in the general population, especially when it comes to advanced degrees. The route to higher education, it appears, is still a bumpy one.

Impediments to admission: The proportion of Ethiopian Israelis matriculating is close to that of the general Jewish population of Israel, but only 54% matriculate at a level high enough for admittance to institutes of higher learning, compared with 75% amongst Israeli Jews in general. Nearly all individuals interviewed had to improve their grades (either by retaking the matriculation exam or by enrolling in a pre-academic course of study) before they could be admitted to academia. Many mentioned the psychometric (college entrance) exam as a significant impediment, and indeed, the average grades of Ethiopian Israelis in the exam is lower by some 100 points than the average score of all those who take the entrance exams.

Choice of institution and major: More than four thousand Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in institutes of higher learning, constituting 1.4 % of all students. Relatively few pursue advanced degrees. In addition, they are under-represented at universities (vs colleges); only 24.1% of Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in universities, compared with 42.3% of all Jewish students. Regarding field of study, Ethiopian students are over-represented in social studies and administration, law, and auxiliary medical professions. In contrast, they are heavily under-represented in STEM professions, engineering and architecture.

First-generation academicians: All the interviewees in the study were the first generation in their families to receive a college degree; they described feelings of non-belonging and alienation, unfamiliarity with the academic system and significant differences between high school demands and academic demands. Many experienced covert or overt racism, low expectations and often loneliness, especially at universities (as opposed to colleges) and in situations in which they were the only persons from their ethnic background in a course of study. Their drop-out rate is relatively high — 25%, compared with 15% for Jewish students as a whole.

Economic hardship and its effect on studies: Most of the interviewees experienced ongoing economic hardship and needed to devote considerable time to work while studying, which often caused delays in completion of their degrees. Economic hardship also affected their choice of where to enroll; some chose the colleges that best enabled them to combine employment and study; however, that choice limited their possibilities of study and later employment.

Employment and integration difficulties: In 2020, only 0.6% of academicians in Israel were Ethiopian Israelis. The figure is low due to the small number of college graduates in the Ethiopian community, as well as to the difficulty of finding employment suitable to their expertise. Among those with bachelor’s degrees, only 18% worked in their fields, compared with 45% among the general population. Some interviewees expanded on how hard it was to translate their education into employment opportunities compatible with their education.

Academicians of Ethiopian origin are concentrated in economic sectors and occupations in which salaries are relatively low, in most cases lower than those of other minority groups. As such, they can be said to pay an “ethnic fine” – discrimination based on ethnic origin. There are many economic sectors in which hardly any Ethiopian Israelis are to be found, while their presence is significant in others — the public sector, health services, manufacturing and maintenance services.

Glass ceiling in the public sector: Despite the increase in representation of Ethiopian Israelis in the public services and local government, most occupy low-level positions and are under-represented in senior positions.

“Hyper visibility,” racism and stereotypes: High visibility intensifies differences in the workplace, as ethnic identity becomes the central factor regarding the worker, overshadowing skill, contribution and individual characteristics. The most salient phenomenon described by most of the interviewees was covert but consistent racism, reflected in lack of confidence in their professional abilities and in increased demands to prove their competence.

The culture of the Ethiopian community as an impediment, for example how hard it was to stand out and to market themselves “aggressively” as other Israelis do. Some defined theirs as “a culture of modesty” that limits one’s ability to dwell on their achievements and demand promotion.

The absence of employment networks and the types of connections needed for landing a job; the method of “friend brings friend” leaves Ethiopian Israelis out in the cold, especially in a situation in which very few Ethiopian Israelis occupy senior positions.

Affirmative action and organizational diversity: Despite awareness of the necessity of these employment strategies for increasing the presence of Ethiopian Israelis in senior positions and facilitating promotion, some mentioned that they might also act as a double-edged sword that reproduces labeling as a separate and inferior group.

The interviewees evinced determination to fight and not give up despite racism and discrimination. Strategies included refusing to work in hostile environments, even resigning to avoid them; viewing their own success as contributing to a change in the negative image of the community; directly confronting racist expressions, either with humor or aggression; or just ignoring or belittling unpleasant occurrences.

When asked what their recommendations were for young Ethiopian Israelis regarding education and employment, the main recommendations of most of the interviewees were “Get yourself a profession!” and “You will need to work twice as hard!”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Education

• Invest in improving the results of the matriculation exams of Ethiopian Israelis.
• Provide tutoring for college entrance exams.
• Direct prospective students to quality institutions and to professions for which there is demand.
• Expand economic assistance so that it includes living grants, especially for students enrolled at universities.

The Labor Market and the Public Sector

• Focus representation policy on promoting Ethiopian Israelis to senior positions in the public service and local government.
• Create clear lines of promotion and include Ethiopian Israelis in committees putting out tenders for senior positions.

Employers, Training and Employment Programs

• Raise the awareness of employers of the economic as well as the social advantages of diversity.
• Train personnel managers in diversity and inclusive work environments.
• Harness large and medium-sized employers to initiate diversity projects, with the involvement of the Ministry of Labor.
• Expand the “LaMerhak” career planning program for academicians, with an emphasis on students in colleges majoring in either the humanities or social studies.
• Promote the integration of Ethiopian Israelis into hi-tech industries and the education system.

The full research paper is available in Hebrew here (PDF).

הפוסט “You will need to work twice as hard”: From Higher Education to the Labor Market – The Trials and Tribulations of Ethiopian Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The figures show that government investment in early education in Israel is 54% lower than the average in OECD countries: while Israel spends on average $5,864 for every child, the OECD average spending per child is actually more than double: $12,750.

Graph: Per Pupil Expenditure by Level in 2021, Israel and OECD Average, in PPP dollars

Source: Adva Center analysis of OECD.  Education at a Glance 2024.

The situation of early education in the public sector is of special concern. Only about a fourth of children aged 0-3 are to be found in subsidized educational frameworks, like family and institutional day care systems. There is a shortage of day care due to the low rate of construction of new institutions and also a shortage of care workers, due to heavy workloads and low remuneration. In addition, staff members are responsible for more children than recommended by professionals, making it more difficult to provide high-quality care and education.

The construction of day care centers has been progressing at a painfully slow pace, mainly due to problems like the lack of public spaces designated for building. Thus, the usage of budgets allocated for the construction of day care centers remains low at all types of local authority. The problem is especially serious in Arab localities, where between 2014 and 2020, these local authorities utilized only 50% of the budgets allocated for day care centers. This contrasts with the situation in non-Haredi Jewish localities, where 61% of such budgets were utilized, and Haredi localities, where 79% of designated budgets were utilized.

As mentioned above, the problem is not only construction but also personnel, from the standpoint of both quality and quantity.

At the level of early education, the figures reveal that Israel’s investment in this level of education in 2021 was significantly lower than the OECD average: Israel invested some $6,800 per child, a sum that was 42% lower than the OECD average, which stood at $11,735 per child.

When it comes to higher levels, Israel invests comparatively more in elementary than in secondary education. At the elementary level, Israel’s outlays per student are only 5% lower than the OECD average. However, in secondary education, which includes both middle and high school, the gap is larger: 21%.

In 2023, the average annual expenditure per student from elementary through high school was higher in state religious education than in state secular education: NIS 25,634, compared with NIS 22,153.

Graph: Percentage Disparity in Per Pupil Expenditure between Israel and the OECD Average, 2021

Source: Adva Center analysis of OECD. Education at a Glance 2024.

As indicated in the above figure, Israel’s investment in post-secondary education is especially low – 52% less than the average in OECD countries; Israel also spends much less on occupational training and non-academic degree programs. Thus, in 2021, the public expenditure on direct training for the job market amounted to 0.13% of GDP, compared to the average of 0.63% of GDP in OECD countries. When it comes to active labor policies, Israel ranks second from the bottom, with only the United States spending relatively less.

Despite the fact that in Israel higher education is subsidized, its investment per student is 33% lower than the average in OECD countries. This means fewer supplementary services like libraries and laboratories, lower investment in research and development and a higher student/instructor ratio.

הפוסט Per Student Investment in Education in Israel is Lower than the Average among OECD Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The nature of socio-economic data is that they become known with the passage of time – some after a few months and others after a year or two or more. In the meantime, the latest socioeconomic data for Israel published by state institutions – the Bank of Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the National Insurance Institute (NII) – are, at best, for 2021, while some are for 2020 and others for 2019.

And during those years, we were subject to another worldwide crisis with socio-economic implications – the Corona epidemic. That epidemic, which has yet to run its course, though it was shunted to the margins of the news by the sights and sounds of the Russian war against the Ukraine, caused the death of millions, the closure of numerous businesses, unemployment rates unknown since the 1929 crash, as well as huge government outlays for aid to individuals and businesses and, of course, on health.

At the same time there were individuals who not only were not adversely affected during the Corona crisis, but actually profited.

This was the case of the ten richest persons in the world, whose combined worth prior to the epidemic stood at 700 billion dollars, a sum that had doubled by 2022 to 1.5 trillion dollars.

Israel’s wealthy partake of the same phenomenon: according to the financial newspaper “The Marker,” the wealth of the 500 richest persons in Israel quadrupled over the last four years and grew by 32% between 2020 and 2021.

The figures presented below reflect the first chapters of the story of the epidemic, which is also a story of the widening of inequality in Israel and elsewhere. This, in hope that the war currently raging in eastern Europe ends quickly and will not become the main story of Israel: A Social Report next year.

הפוסט Israel – A Social Report 2022: The Inequality Epidemic Still Rages הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Over the last years, doubts about the merits of academic education were frequently raised, claiming that an academic degree is no longer relevant to the job market. The common perception connecting education with success, lost its holding and the Y Generation stayed away from the colleges and universities.

Consequently, a variety of career tracks bypassing higher education evolved in the labor market. Yet the data was clear: even before the pandemic unemployment rates among persons with academic degrees was significantly lower, and their wages were higher.

The economic crisis created by the corona, exposed the employment market’s duality and the value of high education. Namely, the vast majority of persons with academic education kept their jobs while persons with high-school education (or less) and low wages, especially in the services industry, were let go in high numbers.

Now young adults are changing the picture. Instead of taking on temporary, low-paid positions that offer no job security or quality career path, they turn to education. Enrolment rates for highly demanded professions, accounting, neuroscience, and engineering peaked. The “corona economy” succeeded where the state that tried for many years to encourage study of these subjects, failed.   

The increase in enrolment to social arts faculties such as philosophy and history – fields were almost obliterated by the practical perception of high education – is especially encouraging.  This due to the inherent value of education, the development of basic skills of reading, writing and analysis, digital literacy, active citizenship, and the ability to integrate in the job market. Moreover, education has a cross-generational impact: the degree of the parents’ education has a direct link to their children’s chances to succeed in school and in their future careers.

The budget allocated to face the corona crisis includes funding of vocational training programs that the government is struggling to implement after years of neglect of the field. Indeed, one would hope that the crisis will bring about improvements in this field as well. Nevertheless, it is no less important to allocate funds to increase accessibility to higher education by funding academic institutions so that they can cater to larger number of students, formation of a support mechanism of scholarship and subsidies so that all of the students admitted – including those of low socioeconomic backgrounds – will complete their degrees. There is also a need to finance matriculation courses and create affordable alternatives to the psychometric exam prep industry so that marginalized populations will have a better chance of being admitted. Similarly, vocational training programs must also receive funding to address the needs of those who are unable or uninterested in pursuing an academic degree.    

The Arrangements Law and Corona Budget allocated tremendous amounts to the transportation system´s infrastructure. Yet, the best investment for Israel at this point is a “New Deal” of investment in education and in its human capital. This is an investment which will yield benefits for years to come, and to future generations. 

// The article was published originally in The Marker (in Hebrew)

הפוסט Let Them Learn: It Is the Time for a “New Deal” in Higher Education הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

In recent years, women economists in developed countries have been studying the need to invest in care work as part of the overall employment policy. This would mean moving from policies that rely on care that is market-based and sometimes exploitive, or on volunteer care work, to quality professional care performed for a fair wage, overseen and regulated by the state. An investment of this kind could address issues such as the care deficit – the growing shortage of care workers; gender inequality in the division of labor, paid or unpaid; employment segregation; and income gaps between women and men and among women themselves.

This document examines the care economy in Israel through the lens of international feminist scholarship. It focuses on two case studies: childcare and care for the elderly. Using these two cases, we examine patterns of public and private investment, and what is required to move to a care economy that promotes fairness. As part of this, we discuss unpaid care work that is performed primarily by women.

Defining the problem: The “care deficit” in developed countries

The “care deficit” (or the “crisis of care”) preoccupies many women engaged in research about the care economy. The term refers to the declining inability in developed countries to provide quality care to meet the needs of people, their children, their elderly parents, and other family members. The care deficit derives from a combination of factors evident in most western countries – the greater participation of women in the workforce and, at the same time, the aging of the population. Having more women in the labor market, some as household breadwinners, has generated a crisis in the caregiving activities within the family. This is compounded by increased life expectancy, which extends the length of time that older family members are in need of care.

Paid and unpaid care work

Women economists globally have examined the impact of unpaid care work, sometimes termed “invisible work,” on economic life, well-being, and human development. A large portion of unpaid labor – particularly services provided within the family – is not defined as “productive” and therefore not incorporated into the national data used to define the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the primary measure of a country’s economic success.

According to calculations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) based on data from 64 countries, 16.4 billion hours of unpaid care work are carried out daily across the world. This figure is equivalent to two billion people working eight hours a day without pay. Were such services valued on the basis of the hourly minimum wage, they would correspond to 11 trillion dollars, or some 9% of global GDP. In every country globally, women do a disproportionate share of unpaid labor – three times more than men according to the ILO.

Unpaid care work has ramifications for women, particularly those working in care jobs for pay. The volume of unpaid care work and the unequal division of household labor constrains women’s workforce participation and the type of job they can hold. Hence the gender gaps in income and assets, but also women’s reduced bargaining power in the labor market and lower social security benefits and pensions. Unpaid care jobs, most of which are performed by women, are assumed to be low-skilled as they are seen as rooted in women’s “natural” work in the home. This undervaluation of unpaid care work leads to low wages and the ongoing decline in employment conditions for care jobs.

In Israel, as in many western countries, those employed in care professions suffer from a double disadvantage: They themselves are marginalized in the labor market and they are engaged in caring for those who are dependent and poor – populations lacking consumer power and generally marginal to public discourse.

To examine the economic benefit of investing in the care sector, the ILO conducted a simulation based on data from 45 countries whose aggregate GDP represents 85% of global GDP and close to 60% of the population worldwide. The combined employment in education, health, and social work in these countries amounted to 206 million employees in 2015, representing nearly 10% of the total workforce and corresponding to 8.7% of the combined GDP of these countries. The simulation analyzed what the care economy would look like in 2030 if the main variables remained constant – current coverage rates, quality standards, and working conditions – and how it would look if the current investment were doubled, while conforming to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. If the status quo scenario prevails, total employment in the care sector will be 358 million jobs in 2030; if the investment were doubled, the result would be 475 million jobs in the care economy by 2030.

The ILO recommends strategies for increasing the investment in care work, such as instituting a more progressive and transparent tax structure. This could mean, for example, taxing wealth more heavily than taxing consumption or work. Consideration could also be given, it notes, to exempting or substantially reducing taxation on care occupations and recognizing care-related expenses as tax deductions.

Alternative feminist models and strategies to integrate care work into economic policy

In recent years, feminist scholars and activists have considered policy alternatives that would fundamentally reorganize care services and their financial substructure. Some have called for a more expansive fiscal policy that focuses on sustainable growth and public investment in social infrastructure, particularly care services. The Triple-R model proposed by British economist Diane Elson sees recognition, reduction, and redistribution as key factors: recognition – making care work visible in national statistics; reduction – reducing the volume and drudgery of unpaid care work by improved technology and investing in social infrastructure such as health and care services; and redistributing unpaid care work by incentivizing it and encouraging men to take part.

The ILO expanded the Elson model and added two additional strategies: reward – a fair wage for care work; and representation – ensuring women’s participation in political and economic decision-making, and their freedom to unionize and conduct collective bargaining.

The case of childcare – between the family and the state

The paper examines Israel’s investment in childcare as measured against the model proposed by Elson and expanded by the ILO: recognition, reduction, redistribution, reward, and representation. It focuses on Israeli support programs that are inadequate and only serve children until age 3, such as maternity/paternity leave, childcare benefits, and public investment in childcare frameworks as well as lengthening the school day and after-school programs for preschoolers and young children (up to age 8).

Israel’s public investment in programs for children under age 3 is low compared to other countries and the OECD average. Public funding for these programs in 2015 amounted to only 15% of the total spent on them. Israel spends $2,713 annually per child under age 3 who is registered in a program (at purchasing power parity rates) compared to $12,433 on average in OECD countries.

For children aged 3-8, the care system is inadequate in terms of the length of the school day and after-school programs for preschool and lower-grade children (to age 8).

These reflect the fact that Israel does not universally invest in subsidized care systems, and has no conception of childcare as essential infrastructure for sustaining society as a whole.

A key feature of the care deficit is the undervaluation of this work, reflected in the low compensation paid to its workers. This subject is examined in two cases: preschool teaching assistants and daycare workers. Both these jobs generally employ women with little training, provide poor working conditions, offer limited opportunity for advancement, and pay a low wage that is not commensurate with the real social and economic value of the work. Teaching assistants and caregivers have been struggling for years to achieve recognition as educators and to improve their employment conditions and professional status.

The case of long-term care for the elderly

The paper also looks at long-term care within the community in light of the care deficit. This is particularly relevant in view of the increased life expectancy and the fast-growing elderly population in Israel, as in other developed countries. Meanwhile, women are increasingly employed in the labor market, and the ability to rely on informal, long-term care by female family members is in decline.

Some 87% of Israel’s elderly who are eligible for long-term care benefits live in the community. Therefore, we focused on home care for the elderly.

The Bank of Israel estimates that in 2015, the national expenditure on long-term care was NIS 14.5 billion, or 1.2% of GDP. National expenditure includes some NIS 7.7 billion from public coffers and approximately NIS 6.8 billion of private spending. Private spending is underestimated, however, because it does not take into account the cost of informal care, i.e., the monetary value of the time invested by women in caring for family members.

Public expenditure on long-term care as a percentage of GDP is low, even taking into account the low proportion of elderly in Israel. In 2014, this expenditure amounted to 0.4% of GDP in Israel, while OECD countries averaged 1.4% of GDP that year.

The main factors explaining the care deficit of the elderly living within the community in Israel are low long-term care benefits, limited services, dependence on family members for care work, and the formal care system’s reliance on low-paid, untrained staff, which leads to an ongoing shortage of caregivers. Another factor is the reliance on foreign caregivers brought to Israel and employed under poor working conditions.

The National Long-term Care Program approved by the Israeli government in 2018 addresses some aspects of the care deficit: It increases public spending and the amount of the benefit, and it allocates resources to expand services, thereby having the potential to ease the economic and care burden on households. Nevertheless, it does not grapple with the critical shortage of home care workers or their poor pay and working conditions, which make it hard for companies to recruit new care workers.

The primary recommendations drawn from this paper would strengthen the system of care services while significantly increasing public investment in them.

הפוסט The Care Deficit: What it Means and How it Can be Reduced הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Where is the other half of the age cohort? The report points to two circumstances:

1. Dropouts
In 2014, the most recent year for which complete figures are available, approximately one-fifth of the relevant age cohort – 19.5% — was not in school. The highest proportions of non-attendance were registered for Haredim – 45.7%, Bedouins residing in the Negev – 36.2%, Arabs (not counting Bedouin or Druze) – 19.7% and Druze – 15.5%. In East Jerusalem, according to an estimate for 2012/2013, the rate of non-attendance was 36% — like that of the Bedouins.

The main reason for non-attendance was dropping out. Between the 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 school years, 2.1% of tenth graders dropped out (1,981 students), 5.0% of 11^th graders dropped out (4,651 students) and 1.1% of twelfth graders dropped out (942 students), for a total of 7,574 drop-outs. The highest drop- out rates were to be found among new immigrants (since 2006) and Haredim: 16.2% of new immigrants and 15.2 % of Haredim dropped out in eleventh grade. More boys than girls dropped out.

To the drop-outs we need to add another group whose chances of matriculating are slim: young people under the charge of truant officers. According to figures published by the National Council for the Child, in 2013/2014 there were 38,200 young people under the charge of truant officers, 62% of them Jews and 32% of them Arabs.

Only about a third of these young people were enrolled in alternative educational frameworks: yeshivas or vocational schools operated by the Ministry of the Economy. In 2014, 19.2% of the drop-outs were to be found in Ministry vocational schools and 13.8% in yeshivas.

2. Operation of the majority of high schools in Israel’s socio-economic periphery by networks specializing in vocational education
The second answer to the question of “where are the other kids” is to be found in the fact that in a good many small, resource-poor localities, like development towns, the local authority transfers the operation of local high schools to external networks specializing in vocational education.

Figures for the two largest networks, ORT and Amal, reveal that in 2014, ORT operated a total of 99 high schools, 38 of which offered academic tracks, 58 technological tracks, and 72 vocational tracks. The picture is similar for the Amal network, which operated 60 high schools: in 21 it offered academic tracks, in 9 technological tracks and in 33 vocational tracks (Both networks are under the supervision of the ministries of Education and the Economy).

71% of the high schools operated by ORT and Amal are located in cities and towns in low socio-economic clusters: 35 in Arab localities, 43 in development towns, and 35 in other localities belonging to socio-economic clusters 1 through 5. In affluent localities, if there is a vocational high school, it is usually located in the low-income neighborhoods.

In vocational tracks, with the exception of the engineering track, success rates in the matriculation exams are lower than those of students following academic tracks.

3. The pressure to expand vocational education in Israel
In recent years, there has been considerable public pressure to expand vocational education. This pressure is surprising, as in 2014 about 40% of high school students were enrolled in vocational tracks, a proportion that is no lower than that in Western European countries.

It appears that the pressure to expand vocational education does not indicate a need for additional graduates of vocational tracks but rather the desire for a different kind of vocational education – for example, the kind of vocational education Germany has. In Israel, vocational education (with the exception of the engineering track) is a residual category, meaning that those enrolled in it were found to be unsuitable for the academic track. In a good many of the vocational tracks, studies are on a lower level than in academic tracks, their graduates do not receive diplomas recognized by employers as qualifying them for a job, and the students complete their studies without any practical training. As stated in a recent OECD report, graduates of these tracks have certificates that lead nowhere.

In Germany, in contrast, there is a long tradition of vocational studies accompanied by practical training in enterprises selected by the government. Students receive a salary and for many of them the practical training is the corridor to permanent employment at the workplace at the end of their studies. Salaries and employment conditions are determined by collective labor agreements, and the conditions for recognition at the end of the track are set jointly by employers and labor unions. After graduation, graduates can enroll in technological colleges and, after additional preparation, in universities.

If this is what persons pressuring to expand vocational education in Israel want, what is needed is not the expansion of existing vocational education but rather extensive reform: in the level of studies, in the supervision of the Ministry of Education, in labor legislation, in salaries, and in cooperation between employers and trade unions.

However, before embarking on such a project, one should ask whether this is the path that Israeli society really wishes to follow. Should we at an early age – the end of intermediate school – decide who to leadership, command and research and who to the assembly line and service occupations? Wouldn’t it make more sense to give all our young people a broad education, including a bachelor’s degree, and only then present them with options for their working lives?

הפוסט Where is the Other Half of the Age Cohort? Twelfth graders who don’t matriculate הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

These figures gain special significance in view of the fact that the industrial sectors leading economic growth, such as the hi-tech industries, are amongst the major employers of persons with academic degrees. Furthermore, these industries are the ones that pay the highest wages; thus, persons with less education face a future with a lower standard of living. A low percentage of persons with higher education does not augur well for the Israeli economy.

Two weeks ago the Ministry of Education published the country-wide results of the 2011 matriculation exams, but the only available figures for localities are still those of 2010 – and these form the basis of this year’s Adva Center report.

Following are some of the other findings:

1. Throughout the decade of 2001-2010, the Israeli education system failed to break the 50% barrier regarding the percentage of the age cohort successfully passing the matriculation exams.

2. The highest matriculation achievements in 2010 – 71.8% of the age cohort succeeding in the exams — were registered in high-income localities; the lowest — 28.2% — in Bedouin towns in the Negev. The figure for Jewish development towns was 50.2% and that for Arab communities – 38.9%.

3. The higher the average income in a locality, the higher the matriculation rate.

For the full report, in Hebrew only Click Here.

הפוסט Percentage of Students Passing Matriculation Exams, by Locality 2009-2010 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

הפוסט Education Reform: Making Education Work for All Children הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

For the Full Report in Hebrew Click Here

הפוסט Percentage of Students Passing Matriculation Exams, by Locality 2008-2009 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Privatization is not only a product of the weakened public service network, but also a catalyst of it. With neoliberal social and economic policies, and a dwindling of public investment in education, the private sector has stepped up its involvement in funding and shaping education. And because private sector activity is rooted in family, sectoral, or business interests, the ability of the state to maintain control over the format and content of education is further eroded.

Privatizing education reflects a process of commodification: The introduction of market principles changes education from what was formerly considered a fundamental civil right – one that helps foster equality of opportunity – to a commodity – to be produced by those with means and acquired by the highest bidder.

Privatization harms the universal infrastructure of public schooling as it undermines the ability of the Ministry of Education to address the needs of all schoolchildren. Privatization also fosters both ethnic and cultural class divisions.

הפוסט Privatization in the Israeli School System: Selected Issues הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.