Subsequent to the war, numerous surveys indicated increasing needs, on the one hand, and decreasing options for meeting those needs, whether the needs were of schoolchildren or adults, and whether the needs were for school councillors, social workers, psychologists or psychiatrists.

With regard to resilience centers, whose purpose is to provide emergency mental health care, their treatment schedules were curtailed, and the continuation of treatment at health funds for individuals in need was and still is limited by a shortage of personnel.

Everything boils down to money: Israel spends relatively little on public mental health care, evidenced by the percentage of the total budget for public health care budgeted and expended on mental health care. For example, during the years 2016-2021, the budget for public mental health services constituted no more than 4% of the expenditures on total  public health care , in 2022 it amounted to 5%, and during the years of the 2023 war, 6%, followed by 7% budgeted for 2025. However, that budget increase (following a war, it should be remembered), is not impressive when compared with the recommended 10% spending on mental health services in high-income OECD countries and with the actual percentage in western European countries, which is much higher — between 12% and 16%.

The present crisis in the treatment of individuals in need of mental health services is first and foremost a crisis of personnel, that is, the difficulty of attracting mental health specialists to the public services, and the shortage of positions in those services, as well as the need to define the number of patients to be treated by professionals in each specialty.

The main recruitment obstacle is the pay, which fails to reflect the investment required with regard to study and training, and is much lower than that in the private sector. It should be pointed out that the majority of public sector mental health workersare women; their inadequate pay contributes to the larger phenomenon of what we havereferred to in other studies as “the treatment deficit.” The shortage of personnel and of positions results in a huge workload, leading to further erosion and leakage of man and woman power from the public services.

The origin of this crisis is inadequate budgeting of the public services over the years, resulting in the inability to provide public mental health services in accordance with demand. Two serious crises that occurred in recent years – the corona epidemic and the October 7, 2023 war – resulted in a sharp increase in needs for such services on the part of the general population as well as of specific social groups – needs that the mental health and welfare services find it hard to meet. This situation is harmful especially to poverty-stricken families and individuals residing in the economic and geographical periphery of the country, where the services are even less accessible, but also to members of the middle class who may find private services beyond their means.

The Ministry of Health introduced a reform that included a budget increase, but its implemention remains partial, due mainly to an ongoing shortage of personnel. Following the 2023 war, mental health services were budgeted at 1.4 billion shekels for the years 2024-25, and in 2025 two labor agreements were signed that significantly increased the salaries of psychiatrists and psychologists employed in the public services. A similar amount was allocated to the Rehabilitation Department of the Defence Ministry, in charge of the treatment of soldiers. However, no solution was provided for the shortage of psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, educational psychologists and educational counselors.

Raising the salaries of psychiatrists and psychologists is an important step that has the potential to attract personnel to the public services, but it was taken very late, and it will take years to harvest the fruits of that move. Moreover, no decision was taken regarding how many patients were to be treated by each mental health expert, thus failing to deal with the huge burden experienced by each — and the subsequent erosion.

Against the background of mental health problems that arose or worsened due to the 2023 war and the social groups that were highly affected, among them reserve soldiers and residents dislocated from their homes, and the inability of the social services to answer the many calls for help, it is entirely likely that the problems will increase in severity. The steps taken to provide real time care, like crash courses for psychology graduates prior to their specialization and their inclusion in the cadre of treatment personnel, the creation of positions like trainers and supporters of mental fortitude, and chat-bots set up by the health funds, are no substitute for genuine professional treatment.

Mental health services cannot be dependent upon ad hoc solutions or emergency services, which are but poor substitutes for professional help: they need to be part and parcel of ongoing, long-term government services that are properly budgeted; otherwise the burden will remain on individual families and thousands of persons in need will remain without.

Translator’s note: This report was written prior to the Iran war, which has no doubt increased the needs described herein.

The full research in Hebrew is available here.

הפוסט The Serious Crisis of Mental Health Services in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Major Findings –

The Journey to Higher Education

The study points out that despite an increase in the rate of college students of Ethiopian origin, their representation in institutions of higher education is still lower than their representation in the general population, especially when it comes to advanced degrees. The route to higher education, it appears, is still a bumpy one.

Impediments to admission: The proportion of Ethiopian Israelis matriculating is close to that of the general Jewish population of Israel, but only 54% matriculate at a level high enough for admittance to institutes of higher learning, compared with 75% amongst Israeli Jews in general. Nearly all individuals interviewed had to improve their grades (either by retaking the matriculation exam or by enrolling in a pre-academic course of study) before they could be admitted to academia. Many mentioned the psychometric (college entrance) exam as a significant impediment, and indeed, the average grades of Ethiopian Israelis in the exam is lower by some 100 points than the average score of all those who take the entrance exams.

Choice of institution and major: More than four thousand Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in institutes of higher learning, constituting 1.4 % of all students. Relatively few pursue advanced degrees. In addition, they are under-represented at universities (vs colleges); only 24.1% of Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in universities, compared with 42.3% of all Jewish students. Regarding field of study, Ethiopian students are over-represented in social studies and administration, law, and auxiliary medical professions. In contrast, they are heavily under-represented in STEM professions, engineering and architecture.

First-generation academicians: All the interviewees in the study were the first generation in their families to receive a college degree; they described feelings of non-belonging and alienation, unfamiliarity with the academic system and significant differences between high school demands and academic demands. Many experienced covert or overt racism, low expectations and often loneliness, especially at universities (as opposed to colleges) and in situations in which they were the only persons from their ethnic background in a course of study. Their drop-out rate is relatively high — 25%, compared with 15% for Jewish students as a whole.

Economic hardship and its effect on studies: Most of the interviewees experienced ongoing economic hardship and needed to devote considerable time to work while studying, which often caused delays in completion of their degrees. Economic hardship also affected their choice of where to enroll; some chose the colleges that best enabled them to combine employment and study; however, that choice limited their possibilities of study and later employment.

Employment and integration difficulties: In 2020, only 0.6% of academicians in Israel were Ethiopian Israelis. The figure is low due to the small number of college graduates in the Ethiopian community, as well as to the difficulty of finding employment suitable to their expertise. Among those with bachelor’s degrees, only 18% worked in their fields, compared with 45% among the general population. Some interviewees expanded on how hard it was to translate their education into employment opportunities compatible with their education.

Academicians of Ethiopian origin are concentrated in economic sectors and occupations in which salaries are relatively low, in most cases lower than those of other minority groups. As such, they can be said to pay an “ethnic fine” – discrimination based on ethnic origin. There are many economic sectors in which hardly any Ethiopian Israelis are to be found, while their presence is significant in others — the public sector, health services, manufacturing and maintenance services.

Glass ceiling in the public sector: Despite the increase in representation of Ethiopian Israelis in the public services and local government, most occupy low-level positions and are under-represented in senior positions.

“Hyper visibility,” racism and stereotypes: High visibility intensifies differences in the workplace, as ethnic identity becomes the central factor regarding the worker, overshadowing skill, contribution and individual characteristics. The most salient phenomenon described by most of the interviewees was covert but consistent racism, reflected in lack of confidence in their professional abilities and in increased demands to prove their competence.

The culture of the Ethiopian community as an impediment, for example how hard it was to stand out and to market themselves “aggressively” as other Israelis do. Some defined theirs as “a culture of modesty” that limits one’s ability to dwell on their achievements and demand promotion.

The absence of employment networks and the types of connections needed for landing a job; the method of “friend brings friend” leaves Ethiopian Israelis out in the cold, especially in a situation in which very few Ethiopian Israelis occupy senior positions.

Affirmative action and organizational diversity: Despite awareness of the necessity of these employment strategies for increasing the presence of Ethiopian Israelis in senior positions and facilitating promotion, some mentioned that they might also act as a double-edged sword that reproduces labeling as a separate and inferior group.

The interviewees evinced determination to fight and not give up despite racism and discrimination. Strategies included refusing to work in hostile environments, even resigning to avoid them; viewing their own success as contributing to a change in the negative image of the community; directly confronting racist expressions, either with humor or aggression; or just ignoring or belittling unpleasant occurrences.

When asked what their recommendations were for young Ethiopian Israelis regarding education and employment, the main recommendations of most of the interviewees were “Get yourself a profession!” and “You will need to work twice as hard!”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Education

• Invest in improving the results of the matriculation exams of Ethiopian Israelis.
• Provide tutoring for college entrance exams.
• Direct prospective students to quality institutions and to professions for which there is demand.
• Expand economic assistance so that it includes living grants, especially for students enrolled at universities.

The Labor Market and the Public Sector

• Focus representation policy on promoting Ethiopian Israelis to senior positions in the public service and local government.
• Create clear lines of promotion and include Ethiopian Israelis in committees putting out tenders for senior positions.

Employers, Training and Employment Programs

• Raise the awareness of employers of the economic as well as the social advantages of diversity.
• Train personnel managers in diversity and inclusive work environments.
• Harness large and medium-sized employers to initiate diversity projects, with the involvement of the Ministry of Labor.
• Expand the “LaMerhak” career planning program for academicians, with an emphasis on students in colleges majoring in either the humanities or social studies.
• Promote the integration of Ethiopian Israelis into hi-tech industries and the education system.

The full research paper is available in Hebrew here (PDF).

הפוסט “You will need to work twice as hard”: From Higher Education to the Labor Market – The Trials and Tribulations of Ethiopian Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

An infographic presentation based on a study by the Adva Center in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on gender pay gaps in Israel.

הפוסט Why Is Women’s Pay Lower Than Men’s? Infographic Presentation הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

As the report itself states, this is hurtful employment: persons employed on an hourly basis earn less than those paid by the month, they have significantly fewer social benefits and it is easy to let them go.

The report is especially relevant today, as the compensation for workers adversely affected by Israel’s war with Iran is based on that implemented during the Gazan war and Corona epidemic, which neglects workers employed by the hour. In cases in which their working hours were reduced, they were not eligible for any compensation.

The median hourly pay for workers employed by the hour is NIS 48, compared with NIS 85 for workers employed on a monthly basis. Some 55% of workers employed by the hour have full-time jobs (defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics as at least 35 hours a week), and their salaries — NIS 46 per hour — are even lower than the average for workers employed part time. Moreover, in all the occupations included in the report that include a large percentage of workers paid by the hour, the workers earn less than workers paid by the month.

The highest proportion of workers paid by the hour can be found among waiters and barmen – 92%. As these are occupations in which mostly young people and students are employed and they involve high turnover, pay by the hour may be justified. However, other occupations in which hourly pay is common do not involve young, temporary workers and high turnover. The reference is to nursing care workers, most of them older women, 80% of whom are paid by the hour; cleaners, (75% of them employed by contrastors and paid by hour); transport and storage workers, mostly men, 70% of whom are paid by the hour; salespersons (66% paid hourly), as well as 60% of salesclerks in stores and 56% of nursery school aides.

Employment by the hour is justified as “flexible employment”. However, due to the extent of its usage, it has become a common method of employment that involves low wages and avoids the payment of proper workplace social rights. As expected, it is utilized for workers with low bargaining power, most of whom have a low level of education and are devoid of occupational skills — workers that include a high representation of Arabs and young people (23% of each). However, hourly employment is not limited to these social groups: Amongst hourly employees, 34% are parents of children up to the age of 14. This constitutes a huge proportion of wage earners working without employment security or a fixed number of hours.

Finally, the employment sectors in which hourly pay has taken root are also characterized by difficulties in recruiting workers – among them nursing care workers and teaching aides. These employees vote with their feet, frequently seeking more stable employment. Thus, public services suffer as well as employers, as the latter forego employment stability in favor of the financial gain they expect from cheap labor.

As it turns out, the situation is dismal: Employment by the hour has become a widely used method for simply reducing the cost of labor.  It is harmful, exploitative and unethical, and in the long run not necessarily economically advantageous. Due to the frequency of the use of employment by the hour, it is high time for Israel to pass a law limiting it to part-time or temporary jobs.

הפוסט Employment by the Hour is Harmful Employment הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

With one fell swoop of an expensive presidential pen, Donald Trump, the new-old president of the United States, announced a series of actions intended to preserve and strengthen the standing of his country as the world’s major power. This was done against the background of the rise of competing powers like China and the European Union. The main actions in question:  a sharp rise in tariffs, a move that will have a negative effect on the economic growth and standard of living of countries for which a significant amount of their national income derives from exports to the US – Israel for example – and a huge cutback in budgets for social services within the home country.

In short, the Donald Trump’s US has abandoned its historical role as the leader of the Western world, concentrating its gaze inward and turning its back on countries that need US assistance in order to become part of the “Western” camp.

It is no secret that the US did not exactly “suffer” from the unique standing it created for itself in the wake of WW II. It went on to enjoy an unprecedented standard of living, continuous economic growth, the development of the most advanced scientific infrastructure and the unchallenged prestige as the leading power in the “Western world.”

At the same time, the US developed the highest military capacity worldwide — and as such served its allies as the place to go for arms and other wartime supplies in time of need. Israel was the main recipient in this respect: Between 1951 and 2024, it received 317 billion dollars in assistance, including 251 billion dollars in direct military aid. During the present war, dubbed “Iron Swords,” the US finances no less than 70 percent of Israel’s war effort.

This aid creates the illusion that Israelis are able to withstand any development on the war front. Thus, the powers that be are able to change the end-date of the war almost daily.

Had the present US aid been utilized for civilian purposes, it might be acceptable. However, US aid to Israel is now exclusively military.

And it is no secret that the financing goes to support the US arms industry, as the money needs to be spent on US-produced weaponry.

Thus, all things considered, it is the Israeli public that is actually financing the war, either through direct taxation or by continuous cutbacks in the social services they receive.

From the standpoint of those social services, which have, at times, been the pride of Israeli society, the worst thing that is happening is that Israel’s military agenda is now sidetracking its socio-economic agenda.

The generous US financing is what stands behind an unprecedented situation for Israelis. At present, it appears possible to continue the war with no end-date and no endgame. And the fact is that civilian life in Israel in the center of the country continues as if there were no war.

While the fighting continues with no clear endgame, it dictates Israel’s political and social agenda. It is said that the war is a great leveler; however, the production of weaponry is not: a good portion of the millionaires and billionaires that made their fortunes in Israel in the course of the last two or three decades did so by producing arms based on hi-tech.

This development had a destructive effect on the agenda of socio-economic equality, for when most of the resources of the economy are in the hands of a few individuals or corporations, the issue of equality is no longer statistical but rather political: Who is able and permitted to speak with the ruler. And better yet, who, literally, calls the shots.

Since the last elections, Israelis have been witness to attempts to create legislation whose main results have been regime corruption, on the one hand, and mass demonstrations against the attempts of a small minority to take over the government of Israel, on the other.

We appear to be returning to the age of kings, in which the king is not only the most powerful man in the kingdom but also the richest.

// Published originally in Hebrew on Zman Israel

הפוסט One Fell Swoop הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The survey illustrates and validates what was already known to aid organizations: over half of the respondents reported feeling financial distress “often”, a rate that is comparable to poverty when applying the official approach in Israel. The level of food insecurity among this population is disturbingly high: approximately 85% experience food insecurity, and 55% experience severe food insecurity. A substantial proportion of their monthly income is spent on housing, while many report poor health conditions due to limited access to health insurance coverage.

The reviewed findings highlight the state’s need to improve the situation of the refugee and asylum seeker population and, indirectly, to improve the situation of Israeli society as a whole. Among the policy proposals mentioned in this document, we note a proposal to implement a mechanism for regularly collecting data on this population to monitor their situation and its improvement according to the desired policy measures; action must be taken to alleviate the suffering of refugees in Israel by providing essential assistance, even if partial, in the areas of social security, housing, a basic package of welfare and health services, and more – until the desired realization of their official refugee status.

Our thanks to Dr. Yuval Livnat, Etty Konor-Attias and Dr. Yael Hasson from the Adva Center, and Tali Ehrenthal (MSW), Hadar Aviel, Zameret Hershco (MSW), Adv. Orly Levinson Sela and Mika Foux from ASSAF, for their helpful comments and support.

Special thanks to the team of the ‘Mesila’ – Aid and Information Centre for Migrant Workers and Refugees at the Tel Aviv–Yafo Municipality, for their partnership in the data collection for this research.

Translated to English by: Lea Dovrat

This publication was co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Adva Center and ASSAF, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

This report was also made possible thanks to the support of MAZON: A Jewish Response to Hunger.

הפוסט The Poor Who Don’t Count: Poverty, Food Security and Economic Well-being among Asylum Seekers in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

These are the trends behind the phenomenon of low-wage employment. The present study examines the trends vis-à-vis such employment in recent years, as well as the characteristics of the workers themselves. The study was undertaken in view of the high percentage, in international comparison, of low-wage workers in Israel, the increase in the proportion of working families living in poverty, and the reduction of remuneration for work.

Low-wage work is not an inevitable phenomenon, and there are steps that can be taken to reduce its prevalence, as recommended by the OECD. These include periodically increasing the minimum wage,  buttressing public investment in active labor policies, strengthening government enforcement of workplace laws, and encouraging unionization, especially in the private sector.

Main Findings

• In 2021-22, 23.3% of employed persons worked for low wages – the highest proportion since 2015 (with the exception of 2020, the year of the Corona epidemic) and one of the highest proportions among OECD countries.

• Looking at gender, the proportion of women working for low pay is twice that of men – 31.5% compared with 15.9%.

• Throughout the period examined (2015-2021-22), there was an improvement in the situation of workers from peripheral areas, workers employed full-time, and workers who immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union. In contrast, the situation of Arab women and men, Haredi men, and workers aged 65 and over deteriorated.

• With regard to occupational sectors, the chances of unskilled workers and individuals employed in sales and services of being employed at low wages was extremely high, and those of skilled workers in both manufacturing and agriculture was also considerable.

• The increase in the proportion of workers with low wages occurred in tandem with the continuing reduction in the share of workers’ income in the national income pie. In 2024, the workers’ share was 56%, the lowest share in 25 years, in contrast to the share of employers, which reached a high of 24% — compared with 18% in 2000. This trend points to the increase in the profitability of employers, at the expense of the paychecks of employees.

• The social groups with the largest proportion of low-income workers include disabled persons, Arab women and men, Haredi women and workers of pension age. Among these groups, the proportion of low-income workers is over 40%.

• A multivariate analysis reveals that the size of the position (full-time, half-time, etc.) is the strongest variable influencing the chances of an individual’s working for a low wage. Controlling for position size and other variables, the chances of women to work for low wages is more than 70% greater than that of men.

הפוסט Work Without Decent Pay in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

This guide is written at a time of a prolonged war in Israel. This war broke out after a year of struggles over the essence of Israeli democracy, and following the COVID-19 pandemic. The implications of these three crises on the role of women in Israeli society and the economy are gradually becoming clear, and with them, the threat to women’s rights. Alongside these implications, we can also identify opportunities for the construction of a democratic and just society, in which gender equality serves as a cornerstone.

Using test cases from Israel and worldwide, we illustrate how gender lens philanthropy can lead to significant and sustainable change. These cases highlight the huge potential of this approach – from realizing values of equality and justice to creating a broad socioeconomic impact and maximizing the effectiveness of grants.

Based among other things on research undertaken to identify challenges and opportunities for the adoption of a gendered perspective in philanthropy, the guide provides knowledge on gender gaps in a variety of social fields in Israel: health, employment, welfare, education, personal safety, civil and family status, the environment, sports, and culture. For each field, we present major challenges as well as action items for philanthropy that can reduce gaps and promote equality.

The guide offers a wide variety of directions for action, from support for dedicated programs for women to incorporating gendered thinking in existing philanthropic work. Quantitative and qualitative data, combined with the analysis of inspiring cases, offers a solid basis for immediate action leading to significant change. This guide also includes practical tools that will help you start or deepen your gender-oriented activism. We believe that gender lens philanthropy is not only the right way, but also the smart way of attaining sustainable influence.

JFN is here to guide funders and foundations in applying the principles of this guide, to facilitate connections with funders and foundations already active in the field, and to provide personalized guidance to deepen your knowledge and implement gender strategies in your philanthropic work.

We invite you to join us on a journey for social change where every action can lead to transformation.

הפוסט Gender Lens Philanthropy: The Complete Guide to Promote Gender Equity through Strategic Philanthropy הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The Defense Budget and the Socio-Economic Budget

Some three decades ago, in October 1995, the Adva Center began publishing independent annual budget analyses of the proposed national budget. In most of the years since that time, the Adva document focused on the socio-economic budget. The reasons for that focus were twofold: one, the fact that Israel’s defense budget was never revealed in full; and two, Adva’s socio-economic analysis became in high demand for dozens of socially oriented organizations that were founded in subsequent years. It will be recalled that a decade before, in 1985, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan was initiated, whose main thrust was privatization of the social services. Since then, most of the social welfare services were handed over to external contractors, as were informal and enrichment educational services. At the same time, efforts were made to weaken labor unions, first and foremost the Histadrut – the national federation of labor.

Not long afterwards, in 2001, Israel found itself in a double bind:  it experienced both the second intifada and the global hi-tech crisis. In response, the government adopted drastic economic measures, the main one being cutbacks in the budgets of Israel’s social services. While those unkind cuts had an adverse effect on the majority of Israelis, the individuals most affected were those with middle and low incomes.

That being the case, we at the Adva Center entitled our annual budget analysis Dark Year. When the national budget of the following year held no respite, we named the next analysis Dark Years. (Published in Hebrew)

A generation has passed since those dark years, and here we are, once again faced with two crises at one and the same time: a war and a severe economic setback. It is no secret that the defense budget and the social affairs budgets are interdependent.

The human suffering caused by the present war is unprecedented in Israel’s war history. Tens of thousands of families are now bereft of loved ones, of their sources of livelihood and of the roof over their heads. On the defense front, the IDF mobilized tens of thousands of reserves for more than a year and utilized a huge quantity of equipment and ammunition. The mobilization of so many reserve soldiers, in turn, had a deleterious effect on many parts of the economy.

What is needed, therefore, is a socio-economic budget that will put the economy back on its feet.  However, this time the budget debate goes beyond the “usual” division between the defense and the social budgets, for the “Iron Swords” war, which began as a “regular” conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, expanded into a far broader confrontation:  a power conflict between the United States and its allies, on the one side, and China, Russia and Iran on the other, over control over the entire Middle East.

As one of the US partners in this battle, Israel found itself fighting in seven different arenas.

Since the beginning of the war in October 2023, the US has provided military aid in the amount of NIS 22 billion.[1]

This amount is often presented as a “gift”; however, it is a self-gift, as most of it is utilized for the purchase of equipment and armaments from US firms, thus strengthening the US defense industry. [2]

Not only that: the equipment thus purchased requires active utilization and regular maintenance by Israeli military personnel. In other words, what we have is an arrangement that obligates Israel to maintain a large defense budget for years to come. Stated differently, that arrangement stands in the way of Israel’s continued development of a proper social budget.

That is exactly the way the present extreme right-wing Minister of Finance, Betzalel Smotrich, views the situation, but from the opposite point of view. In a press conference held on September 3, 2024, Smotrich described the burden of defense as one that is to continue for a long time to come. He stressed that Israel will have to continue to fight on all the fronts of the present war – the South, the North, the West Bank and also more distant locations, as it has no choice.

Against this background, the 2025 budget proposal promises Israelis numerous “dark years” — years without a social agenda.

הפוסט Dark Years for Israel: Comments on the Proposed National Budget for 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A different approach is exemplified in an essay entitled “The Cost of Living in Israel: Low Salaries or High Prices?” written at the research institute of the Histadrut (federation of labor unions) – Forum Arlozoroff.[3]

Firstly, in contrast with the “optimistic” approach, this essay finds that the cost of living in Israel is indeed high; moreover, the phenomenon is attributed to low salaries rather than high prices. It should be noted that the indicator of pay utilized is the average hourly wage rather than the average (monthly) one. The reasoning behind this choice is that “the hourly wage provides a measurement of how many hours a person needs to work in order to purchase a certain amount of consumer goods.”[4] We add that a significant proportion of employed persons do not have full-time jobs (Some 25% in Israel according to a manpower survey for the month of October 2023).[5] The main contention of this article is that despite Israel’s “impressive” economic growth over the past two decades, the purchasing power of salaries has eroded in international comparison; not only that: the purchasing power in Israel at present is lower than it was at the turn of the century. Regarding household expenditures, two categories  — housing, electricity and water; and food and beverages — have become much more expensive in Israel, compared with the OECD average. In contrast to the previous approach, this one does not view food and housing expenses as exceptional and certainly not as peripheral, but rather as the main expenses of Israeli households, as together they constitute more than 50% of the difference between what we Israelis spend and what households in the developed nations of the OECD spend. I venture to add that most Israelis would agree that these expenditures are far from marginal.

Yet another approach is that familiar to readers of The Marker, the financial and business magazine of the newspaper Haaretz,  whose focus is on prices and not on income – specifically, the prices of food and beverages. This approach coincides with the perceptions of numerous Israelis, who see with their own eyes how food purchases become more expensive from month to month — and even week to week. The contention of The Marker is that what we see is an increase in the cost of living, and it stems mainly from SIMPLE GREED on the part of the supermarket chains  (more than others) and the companies that produce foods and beverages. These parts of the food chain have been raising their prices above and beyond increases in raw materials and the costs of production. Furthermore, the present government has done nothing whatsoever to prevent wildcat increases in the costs of essential items.

The three different approaches to the cost of living in Israel point to a number of directions to be taken. The “optimistic” approach seeks the solution in reducing concentration (of supermarkets, for example) and in increasing competition;  the low income approach seeks the panacea in increasing the educational level of Israelis and their productivity and, of course, in raising salary levels; the high food prices approach looks to competition, competition and yet more competition (in food production, food marketing and food importation). That said, there is no sign of any governmental body taking any action that might contribute to one or more of the solutions proposed. In the absence of significant government intervention or serious opposition of the Histadrut and/or consumer organizations aimed at placing the welfare of the population front and center,  numerous families will continue to cope with the high cost of living and low salaries that severely limit their options.

הפוסט Everybody is Talking About the Cost of Living in Israel but Nobody is Doing Anything About It הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.