As the report itself states, this is hurtful employment: persons employed on an hourly basis earn less than those paid by the month, they have significantly fewer social benefits and it is easy to let them go.

The report is especially relevant today, as the compensation for workers adversely affected by Israel’s war with Iran is based on that implemented during the Gazan war and Corona epidemic, which neglects workers employed by the hour. In cases in which their working hours were reduced, they were not eligible for any compensation.

The median hourly pay for workers employed by the hour is NIS 48, compared with NIS 85 for workers employed on a monthly basis. Some 55% of workers employed by the hour have full-time jobs (defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics as at least 35 hours a week), and their salaries — NIS 46 per hour — are even lower than the average for workers employed part time. Moreover, in all the occupations included in the report that include a large percentage of workers paid by the hour, the workers earn less than workers paid by the month.

The highest proportion of workers paid by the hour can be found among waiters and barmen – 92%. As these are occupations in which mostly young people and students are employed and they involve high turnover, pay by the hour may be justified. However, other occupations in which hourly pay is common do not involve young, temporary workers and high turnover. The reference is to nursing care workers, most of them older women, 80% of whom are paid by the hour; cleaners, (75% of them employed by contrastors and paid by hour); transport and storage workers, mostly men, 70% of whom are paid by the hour; salespersons (66% paid hourly), as well as 60% of salesclerks in stores and 56% of nursery school aides.

Employment by the hour is justified as “flexible employment”. However, due to the extent of its usage, it has become a common method of employment that involves low wages and avoids the payment of proper workplace social rights. As expected, it is utilized for workers with low bargaining power, most of whom have a low level of education and are devoid of occupational skills — workers that include a high representation of Arabs and young people (23% of each). However, hourly employment is not limited to these social groups: Amongst hourly employees, 34% are parents of children up to the age of 14. This constitutes a huge proportion of wage earners working without employment security or a fixed number of hours.

Finally, the employment sectors in which hourly pay has taken root are also characterized by difficulties in recruiting workers – among them nursing care workers and teaching aides. These employees vote with their feet, frequently seeking more stable employment. Thus, public services suffer as well as employers, as the latter forego employment stability in favor of the financial gain they expect from cheap labor.

As it turns out, the situation is dismal: Employment by the hour has become a widely used method for simply reducing the cost of labor.  It is harmful, exploitative and unethical, and in the long run not necessarily economically advantageous. Due to the frequency of the use of employment by the hour, it is high time for Israel to pass a law limiting it to part-time or temporary jobs.

הפוסט Employment by the Hour is Harmful Employment הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

With one fell swoop of an expensive presidential pen, Donald Trump, the new-old president of the United States, announced a series of actions intended to preserve and strengthen the standing of his country as the world’s major power. This was done against the background of the rise of competing powers like China and the European Union. The main actions in question:  a sharp rise in tariffs, a move that will have a negative effect on the economic growth and standard of living of countries for which a significant amount of their national income derives from exports to the US – Israel for example – and a huge cutback in budgets for social services within the home country.

In short, the Donald Trump’s US has abandoned its historical role as the leader of the Western world, concentrating its gaze inward and turning its back on countries that need US assistance in order to become part of the “Western” camp.

It is no secret that the US did not exactly “suffer” from the unique standing it created for itself in the wake of WW II. It went on to enjoy an unprecedented standard of living, continuous economic growth, the development of the most advanced scientific infrastructure and the unchallenged prestige as the leading power in the “Western world.”

At the same time, the US developed the highest military capacity worldwide — and as such served its allies as the place to go for arms and other wartime supplies in time of need. Israel was the main recipient in this respect: Between 1951 and 2024, it received 317 billion dollars in assistance, including 251 billion dollars in direct military aid. During the present war, dubbed “Iron Swords,” the US finances no less than 70 percent of Israel’s war effort.

This aid creates the illusion that Israelis are able to withstand any development on the war front. Thus, the powers that be are able to change the end-date of the war almost daily.

Had the present US aid been utilized for civilian purposes, it might be acceptable. However, US aid to Israel is now exclusively military.

And it is no secret that the financing goes to support the US arms industry, as the money needs to be spent on US-produced weaponry.

Thus, all things considered, it is the Israeli public that is actually financing the war, either through direct taxation or by continuous cutbacks in the social services they receive.

From the standpoint of those social services, which have, at times, been the pride of Israeli society, the worst thing that is happening is that Israel’s military agenda is now sidetracking its socio-economic agenda.

The generous US financing is what stands behind an unprecedented situation for Israelis. At present, it appears possible to continue the war with no end-date and no endgame. And the fact is that civilian life in Israel in the center of the country continues as if there were no war.

While the fighting continues with no clear endgame, it dictates Israel’s political and social agenda. It is said that the war is a great leveler; however, the production of weaponry is not: a good portion of the millionaires and billionaires that made their fortunes in Israel in the course of the last two or three decades did so by producing arms based on hi-tech.

This development had a destructive effect on the agenda of socio-economic equality, for when most of the resources of the economy are in the hands of a few individuals or corporations, the issue of equality is no longer statistical but rather political: Who is able and permitted to speak with the ruler. And better yet, who, literally, calls the shots.

Since the last elections, Israelis have been witness to attempts to create legislation whose main results have been regime corruption, on the one hand, and mass demonstrations against the attempts of a small minority to take over the government of Israel, on the other.

We appear to be returning to the age of kings, in which the king is not only the most powerful man in the kingdom but also the richest.

// Published originally in Hebrew on Zman Israel

הפוסט One Fell Swoop הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The Defense Budget and the Socio-Economic Budget

Some three decades ago, in October 1995, the Adva Center began publishing independent annual budget analyses of the proposed national budget. In most of the years since that time, the Adva document focused on the socio-economic budget. The reasons for that focus were twofold: one, the fact that Israel’s defense budget was never revealed in full; and two, Adva’s socio-economic analysis became in high demand for dozens of socially oriented organizations that were founded in subsequent years. It will be recalled that a decade before, in 1985, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan was initiated, whose main thrust was privatization of the social services. Since then, most of the social welfare services were handed over to external contractors, as were informal and enrichment educational services. At the same time, efforts were made to weaken labor unions, first and foremost the Histadrut – the national federation of labor.

Not long afterwards, in 2001, Israel found itself in a double bind:  it experienced both the second intifada and the global hi-tech crisis. In response, the government adopted drastic economic measures, the main one being cutbacks in the budgets of Israel’s social services. While those unkind cuts had an adverse effect on the majority of Israelis, the individuals most affected were those with middle and low incomes.

That being the case, we at the Adva Center entitled our annual budget analysis Dark Year. When the national budget of the following year held no respite, we named the next analysis Dark Years. (Published in Hebrew)

A generation has passed since those dark years, and here we are, once again faced with two crises at one and the same time: a war and a severe economic setback. It is no secret that the defense budget and the social affairs budgets are interdependent.

The human suffering caused by the present war is unprecedented in Israel’s war history. Tens of thousands of families are now bereft of loved ones, of their sources of livelihood and of the roof over their heads. On the defense front, the IDF mobilized tens of thousands of reserves for more than a year and utilized a huge quantity of equipment and ammunition. The mobilization of so many reserve soldiers, in turn, had a deleterious effect on many parts of the economy.

What is needed, therefore, is a socio-economic budget that will put the economy back on its feet.  However, this time the budget debate goes beyond the “usual” division between the defense and the social budgets, for the “Iron Swords” war, which began as a “regular” conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, expanded into a far broader confrontation:  a power conflict between the United States and its allies, on the one side, and China, Russia and Iran on the other, over control over the entire Middle East.

As one of the US partners in this battle, Israel found itself fighting in seven different arenas.

Since the beginning of the war in October 2023, the US has provided military aid in the amount of NIS 22 billion.[1]

This amount is often presented as a “gift”; however, it is a self-gift, as most of it is utilized for the purchase of equipment and armaments from US firms, thus strengthening the US defense industry. [2]

Not only that: the equipment thus purchased requires active utilization and regular maintenance by Israeli military personnel. In other words, what we have is an arrangement that obligates Israel to maintain a large defense budget for years to come. Stated differently, that arrangement stands in the way of Israel’s continued development of a proper social budget.

That is exactly the way the present extreme right-wing Minister of Finance, Betzalel Smotrich, views the situation, but from the opposite point of view. In a press conference held on September 3, 2024, Smotrich described the burden of defense as one that is to continue for a long time to come. He stressed that Israel will have to continue to fight on all the fronts of the present war – the South, the North, the West Bank and also more distant locations, as it has no choice.

Against this background, the 2025 budget proposal promises Israelis numerous “dark years” — years without a social agenda.

הפוסט Dark Years for Israel: Comments on the Proposed National Budget for 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A different approach is exemplified in an essay entitled “The Cost of Living in Israel: Low Salaries or High Prices?” written at the research institute of the Histadrut (federation of labor unions) – Forum Arlozoroff.[3]

Firstly, in contrast with the “optimistic” approach, this essay finds that the cost of living in Israel is indeed high; moreover, the phenomenon is attributed to low salaries rather than high prices. It should be noted that the indicator of pay utilized is the average hourly wage rather than the average (monthly) one. The reasoning behind this choice is that “the hourly wage provides a measurement of how many hours a person needs to work in order to purchase a certain amount of consumer goods.”[4] We add that a significant proportion of employed persons do not have full-time jobs (Some 25% in Israel according to a manpower survey for the month of October 2023).[5] The main contention of this article is that despite Israel’s “impressive” economic growth over the past two decades, the purchasing power of salaries has eroded in international comparison; not only that: the purchasing power in Israel at present is lower than it was at the turn of the century. Regarding household expenditures, two categories  — housing, electricity and water; and food and beverages — have become much more expensive in Israel, compared with the OECD average. In contrast to the previous approach, this one does not view food and housing expenses as exceptional and certainly not as peripheral, but rather as the main expenses of Israeli households, as together they constitute more than 50% of the difference between what we Israelis spend and what households in the developed nations of the OECD spend. I venture to add that most Israelis would agree that these expenditures are far from marginal.

Yet another approach is that familiar to readers of The Marker, the financial and business magazine of the newspaper Haaretz,  whose focus is on prices and not on income – specifically, the prices of food and beverages. This approach coincides with the perceptions of numerous Israelis, who see with their own eyes how food purchases become more expensive from month to month — and even week to week. The contention of The Marker is that what we see is an increase in the cost of living, and it stems mainly from SIMPLE GREED on the part of the supermarket chains  (more than others) and the companies that produce foods and beverages. These parts of the food chain have been raising their prices above and beyond increases in raw materials and the costs of production. Furthermore, the present government has done nothing whatsoever to prevent wildcat increases in the costs of essential items.

The three different approaches to the cost of living in Israel point to a number of directions to be taken. The “optimistic” approach seeks the solution in reducing concentration (of supermarkets, for example) and in increasing competition;  the low income approach seeks the panacea in increasing the educational level of Israelis and their productivity and, of course, in raising salary levels; the high food prices approach looks to competition, competition and yet more competition (in food production, food marketing and food importation). That said, there is no sign of any governmental body taking any action that might contribute to one or more of the solutions proposed. In the absence of significant government intervention or serious opposition of the Histadrut and/or consumer organizations aimed at placing the welfare of the population front and center,  numerous families will continue to cope with the high cost of living and low salaries that severely limit their options.

הפוסט Everybody is Talking About the Cost of Living in Israel but Nobody is Doing Anything About It הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The figures show that government investment in early education in Israel is 54% lower than the average in OECD countries: while Israel spends on average $5,864 for every child, the OECD average spending per child is actually more than double: $12,750.

Graph: Per Pupil Expenditure by Level in 2021, Israel and OECD Average, in PPP dollars

Source: Adva Center analysis of OECD.  Education at a Glance 2024.

The situation of early education in the public sector is of special concern. Only about a fourth of children aged 0-3 are to be found in subsidized educational frameworks, like family and institutional day care systems. There is a shortage of day care due to the low rate of construction of new institutions and also a shortage of care workers, due to heavy workloads and low remuneration. In addition, staff members are responsible for more children than recommended by professionals, making it more difficult to provide high-quality care and education.

The construction of day care centers has been progressing at a painfully slow pace, mainly due to problems like the lack of public spaces designated for building. Thus, the usage of budgets allocated for the construction of day care centers remains low at all types of local authority. The problem is especially serious in Arab localities, where between 2014 and 2020, these local authorities utilized only 50% of the budgets allocated for day care centers. This contrasts with the situation in non-Haredi Jewish localities, where 61% of such budgets were utilized, and Haredi localities, where 79% of designated budgets were utilized.

As mentioned above, the problem is not only construction but also personnel, from the standpoint of both quality and quantity.

At the level of early education, the figures reveal that Israel’s investment in this level of education in 2021 was significantly lower than the OECD average: Israel invested some $6,800 per child, a sum that was 42% lower than the OECD average, which stood at $11,735 per child.

When it comes to higher levels, Israel invests comparatively more in elementary than in secondary education. At the elementary level, Israel’s outlays per student are only 5% lower than the OECD average. However, in secondary education, which includes both middle and high school, the gap is larger: 21%.

In 2023, the average annual expenditure per student from elementary through high school was higher in state religious education than in state secular education: NIS 25,634, compared with NIS 22,153.

Graph: Percentage Disparity in Per Pupil Expenditure between Israel and the OECD Average, 2021

Source: Adva Center analysis of OECD. Education at a Glance 2024.

As indicated in the above figure, Israel’s investment in post-secondary education is especially low – 52% less than the average in OECD countries; Israel also spends much less on occupational training and non-academic degree programs. Thus, in 2021, the public expenditure on direct training for the job market amounted to 0.13% of GDP, compared to the average of 0.63% of GDP in OECD countries. When it comes to active labor policies, Israel ranks second from the bottom, with only the United States spending relatively less.

Despite the fact that in Israel higher education is subsidized, its investment per student is 33% lower than the average in OECD countries. This means fewer supplementary services like libraries and laboratories, lower investment in research and development and a higher student/instructor ratio.

הפוסט Per Student Investment in Education in Israel is Lower than the Average among OECD Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

With regard to employment, the employment rate of Arab women in Israel at the primary work ages (25-64) have increased sharply since 2012, reaching a high of 46% in September 2023 — the eve of the war. The increase in the employment rate was true for all age groups and was the result, among others, of the implementation (if only partial) of the previous Five Year Plan and of policies supporting employment of Arab citizens (resilience centers, vocational training, day care centers, infrastructure development and more). In the first months of the war, the employment rate of Arab women dropped to 41% (November 2023). At the same time, the employment rate of Arab men decreased from 77% to 66%.[1]

According to the Bank of Israel, the decrease in the employment rate of Arab women in October was similar to that of Jewish women. A common factor for both groups was the closure of educational frameworks following the outbreak of war. Jewish women were absent from work due to additional circumstances — the mobilization of their husbands. In view of the fact that this was not a factor for Arab women, it might be expected that the decrease in their employment rate would be lower than that of Jewish women.[2] As we will see, the fear of Arab women of working in a mixed environment may also have been a factor in the employment rate decrease. Moreover, according to the Bank of Israel, during the months of November and December 2023, the employment of Jewish and Arab women recovered to a similar degree, placing both three percentage points below the rates prior to the war. The same report indicated that Arab men, who experienced a greater decrease in their employment, registered a slower recovery.[3]  At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that Arab women’s employment rate has been the lowest among  Israel’s social groups and that their average salary is also very low (NIS 6,099 a month on average in 2021, compared with NIS 8,670 among all women).[4]

In addition to a decrease in their employment rate, numerous Arab women reported working fewer hours. The tensions between Arab and Jewish communities in Israel had the effect of limiting employment opportunities even more, especially in mixed environments; thus the harm done to Arab women’s employment is also connected to feelings of insecurity: 40% of women working in mixed Jewish-Arab work environments reported a decrease in working hours, compared with 27% of women working in Arab environments.[5]

A survey conducted among Arab hi-tech engineers in December 2023 revealed feelings of insecurity at work and in public places during the war, as well as significant fear of expressing their opinions. Those feelings were more salient among women, who had more qualms about going to work (30% of women, compared with 16% of men) and speaking Arabic at the workplace ( 19% of women, compared with 13% of men). Likewise, more women than men were afraid to show their presence in Jewish or mixed spaces (38% compared with 30%).[6]

Arab women’s lack of personal security is also connected with the high incidence of crime and murder in Arab society, as well as state neglect in this regard. And one can add the ease with which guns are licensed, leading to greater dissemination of both legal and illegal arms and subsequently greater dangers to women at home and in public places. Between 2020 and 2022, 27 Arab women were killed by guns, most of them illegally held.[7]

Cutbacks in five year plans for Arab society, whose aims are to narrow gaps and develop Arab society, and the freezing of balance grants to low-income local local authorities, have had an adverse effect on Arab society, especially on social welfare programs and resilience centers whose purpose is to support young people at risk, along with elderly and female victims of violence. In addition, the budgets of government ministries were cut, including those that deal with health, social welfare and education, which need to deal with challenges unknown in the past. These services find it difficult to provide assistance under conditions of acute lacks of budgets and personnel. Arab women employed in these services are faced with additional challenges. Thus, for example, a report of the Ad’ar Association points to the fact that the shortage of Arab social workers, who work for low wages and under conditions of psychological stress in a period of violence and national tensions, is exacerbated by feelings of rejection by their Jewish colleagues, along with feelings of helplessness, fear and the avoidance of any talk about political matters.[8]

Stemming the ongoing harm done to Arab women and to Arab society in Israel in general requires concerted efforts, as well as the investment of resources on the part of the central government and the local authorities, in order to create safe and supportive  environments in which Arab women can thrive both socially and economically. Such efforts are vital in order to prevent further deterioration in the socio-econlmic status of Arab women and to promote their full integration into Israeli society.

הפוסט The Threat to the Economic and Personal Security of Arab Women Wrought by the War הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Rising defense costs

Still, this is not the main problem with the latest budget proposals. The main problem is what appears to be a limitless increase in the total budget for defense. The 2024 defense budget is slated to increase over that of 2023 by NIS 55b. Thus, together with the monies provided by US assistance, this allocation is slated to amount to the considerable sum of NIS 125b.

But that is not all: after the war has been paid for, the talk is of a permanent annual increase to the defense budget of NIS 20b. Indeed, the Finance Ministry mentioned the figure of NIS 20b., while the Defense Ministry demanded an annual increase of NIS 60b.

In light of these amounts, what needs to be said to those who are up in arms – and justly so – against the coalition payments, “It’s the defense budget, stupid.”

The increase to Israel’s defense budget is based on the assumption that the main response to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in general and to hostilities originating in Gaza specifically needs to be military. This is the background of the apparent readiness to give the IDF whatever it asks for.

The future of the war in Gaza

However, there are questions that need to be considered, such as does Israel really intend to continue fighting for the next four years? Does Israel really intend to deal with the Palestinians by military means only? Are there really no other options?

These questions are important because they present the size of the defense budget as one horn of a dilemma: Israel does not have the means to provide both a greatly enlarged defense budget and better social services. If the defense budget increases, the budget for social services decreases, and vice versa.

A good example of this dilemma can be seen in the following. According to Finance Ministry figures, in the decade between 2012 and 2022, the budget for social services – health, education, higher education, social security, and social welfare – increased more than the budget for defense.

The relatively slow growth of the defense budget enabled Israel to devote larger sums to its social services. The latter grew from NIS 120.7b. to NIS 210.9b. – an increase of some 70%. In contrast, the defense budget grew by 10% – from NIS 68.2b. to NIS 75b.

In retrospect, it appears that those years represented a period of grace, which began with the 2011 social protest slogan, “The people want social justice,” and ended with the government’s successful handling of the coronavirus pandemic.

The need to invest in Israeli social services

The need for a massive investment in Israel’s social services is well-known. On most socio-economic indicators, Israel is located at the bottom of the OECD scale. The situation is such that even if there are no budget cuts, the services suffer from a lack of man – and mostly woman – power, as relatively few professionals are willing to work for the low salaries offered.

And now the revised budget for fiscal 2024 posits a large increase for the defense budget, thus decreasing the budget for social services. And this is happening during a time when the war itself has been creating new needs every day – assisting hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, hundreds of thousands of unemployed persons, and thousands of small businesses with no way of making a living.

The situation may arise in which when demobilized soldiers ask for assistance and rehabilitation, they are informed that “the money was depleted by the war.” What may happen is that next to all the placards declaring, “Together to Victory,” there will be others lamenting, “No more Together. Everyone for themselves.”

// The article was originally published in English in the Jerusalem Post

הפוסט It’s the Defense Budget, Stupid הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The inactivity of young Arabs has repercussions beyond those for the individuals themselves. Inactivity leads to a decrease in feelings of capability, faulty interpersonal skills, social isolation, depression and economic burdens on households. Inactivity perpetuates socio-economic gaps, increases poverty levels and burdens community social services.[1] Finally, there is a correlation between the high percentage of inactive Arab youth and the high crime rate among members of this group.

According to the State Comptroller’s Report,  there is a disturbing gap between Arab and Jewish youth:  25% of young male Arabs and 34% of young female Arabs are to be found in the catetory of inactive young people, compared with 14% of young male Jews and 17% of young female Jews. Moreover, according to the report, Arab Youth in Israel (2023), some 40.5% of Arabs between the ages of 18 and 24 are below the poverty line, compared with 14.8% of Jews in the same age group.[2] Since the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” war, there has been a significant decrease in employment among Arabs; thus the poverty rate among Arab youth is expected to rise even higher.

The economic distress experienced by inactive young Arabs often leads to involvement in criminal activity; 48.6% of the criminal cases filed against persons aged 18-24 involve Arabs,[3] which is much higher than their percentage of the population in this age group (30%).[4]  In serious cases, criminal activity is liable to deteriorate into organized crime or terrorist actions.

For the very purpose of preventing such eventualities, the Israeli government earmarked 1.4 billion shekels for initiatives to provide employment opportunities for young Arabs, focusing on the development of professional skills, increasing Hebrew language proficiency and obtaining employment.  This program is central for dealing with the problem of inactive Arab youth, and it is expected to reduce the threat of falling into crime and violence.

This is a decisive moment in Israel’s responsibility for Arab society as well as for Israel as a whole. A budget cut in the 5-year plan – especially the planned cut of 15% — according to the revised budget for 2024 – is liable to negate the progress made to date and to increase the level of violence in Arab society.

// The English version of this article was originally published in The Times of Israel, on 21 February 2024.

הפוסט Proposed budget cuts will have an adverse effect on Arab youth הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The revised 2024 budget is characterized mainly by a huge increase in the defense budget, an increase far larger than anything we have seen in the past. And this is to be voted upon without any presentation to the general public or to the Knesset itself of a specific plan, or alternative plans, vis-à-vis what is to happen when the fighting ends. Does the present government anticipate years and years of war against the Hamas? Has it lost all belief in the possibility of a political solution? And worse yet – has the incumbent government abandoned the very possibility of a political solution, preferring instead ongoing hostilities with Palestinians? In the absence of political goals it is difficult, nay impossible, to calculate costs and construct a budget based on what it is that Israel is aiming for. The option of continued fighting until the Hamas is disbanded requires an immense investment,  in order to maintain a large armed force for many years to come, while the option of fighting only until the Americans say “Stop!” – as was the case in previous rounds of fighting – requires a smaller sum.

In the absence of clear goals and in light of the fact that Israel’s generals are asking for more and more time to achieve their military ends, what we have is a budget predicated on a prolonged war and by military actions guided by the notion that what has failed to be achieved by force will be achieved with greater force.

The absence of a program for “the day after” will have an adverse effect on Israel’s social services, including education, health, welfare and higher education. This, due to the fact that, among others, a greatly enlarged defense budget will come at the expense of reduced social services, for which there is no credible plan either. Will the state provide full financing for the formidable project of returning displaced persons to homes in located in the Gaza envelope or adjacent to the Lebanon border? Will the state provide full financing to repair the vast infrastructure damage? Or will it supply some sort of basic compensation and then leave the rest to the “free market.” The latter may result in reducing thousands of households to a level of income below the poverty line. These questions are especially significant in light of the fact that for years now, Israel’s social services have been suffering from a lack of personnel, including teachers, nurses and social workers, due to the low salaries paid in the public sector.

Moreover, the social services budget is completely devoid of vision or soul. The budget and accompanying documents contain  no statement about the social services whatsoever – nothing about reviving public education, nothing about broadening higher education or reinforcing the public health system, nothing about increasing investments in localities in which Arab citizens of Israel reside, rather than decreasing them, the latter of which is one of the salient features of the new budget. Soldiers fighting in the various arenas of the present war will be demobilized into a society much less caring than what is implied by the popular war slogan, “We are all together in this.”

There remains a crucial issue: where will the financing come from for a much larger defense allotment as well as for the tasks ahead: rebuilding the settlements in the Gaza envelope as well as those near the Lebanese border, and reinforcing the social services?

Now, the main source of state revenue is taxation. Taxes are of two kinds: direct taxes (the major one of which is income tax) and indirect taxes (the major one of which is VAT). Together, the two examples constitute half of state revenues from taxation. As is well-known, income tax is more equitable, as low-income persons are either exempt or pay a lower percentage of their earnings, while higher income persons pay a larger percent of their earnings, while VAT is less equitable, as all individuals pay the same tax on purchases, and as such, low-income individuals pay a higher percentage of their income. In recent years, state revenues from VAT have been greater than revenues from income tax. The present government’s budgetary decision to raise VAT rather than income tax levels is evidence of the continuation of a less equitable approach to financing the war.

Israel’s national budget for 2024 indicates a “day after” with more warfare, less welfare and less equity.

// This op-ed was published in Hebrew in the newspaper Maariv

הפוסט Israel’s New 2024 Budget: More Warfare, Less Welfare הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Studies show that only a minority of victims report the violence they experience. As a result, only partial official information about victims of violence is available to the authorities, representing just the tip of the iceberg.

Data from 2021 shows that tens of thousands of women victims of violence reported this to the police: 21,936 reported physical violence, 21,972 reported threats, and 5,444 women reported sexual crimes. In the same year, there were 13,106 patients in centers for the prevention and treatment of domestic violence, of which 66.2% were women, 11.4% were children and 22.5% were men. That year, 1,918 women, girls and boys stayed in shelters from domestic violence.

Women who are unable to get out of violent relationships and receive proper protection from the authorities pay with their lives: about 25 women in Israel have been murdered each year over the past several years, about half of them by their partners. Pro arming policymakers chose, unfortunately, to ignore this data.

Bringing firearms into the home may deepen patterns of violence against women, and certainly the sense of threat experienced by victims of domestic violence.

As much as the government has no intention of withdrawing from the dangerous policy of mass distribution of weapons, it should at least act to minimize the inherent danger. Therefore, it is necessary to act without delay to implement the recommendations of the 2019 Firearms License Procedure Audit Committee report (the Ronen Committee), and pay closer attention to the arguments put forward by women’s organizations and civil society organizations, led by the “Gun on the Kitchen Table” coalition.”

In order to minimize the expected harm to women, the national security policy with regard to the distribution of weapons must include, among other things: interfaces between the Ministry of Welfare and National Insurance and the Israel Police, the creation of supervision and control mechanisms that will include the obligation to install a safe, an in-depth examination of the consequences of the mass arming that will include collecting and publishing data systematically; revoking licenses issued in violation of the law and/or based on flawed procedures, a plan to collect weapons the day after the war, and implementing a policy of reducing the phenomenon of domestic violence.

הפוסט Sisterhood of Gun Violence: Women will Bear the Consequences of the Arming of the Israeli Civilian Population הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.