The businesses owned by the survey participants are mostly very small businesses, and most do not employ additional workers. These businesses tend to operate in fields such as grooming and cosmetics, food and cooking, personal coaching and training, design and art, and education and teaching. These fields rely heavily on direct contact with customers and in-person activity, making them especially vulnerable during periods of crisis and activity restrictions.

The study’s findings indicate that during crisis periods, most business owners experienced significant damage to their business activity and income. Between 60% and 70% of respondents reported a decline in business income during the crisis periods examined, and in many cases business activity was also temporarily halted. Alongside the economic damage, many of the women described feelings of ongoing uncertainty, difficulty planning ahead, and psychological burnout stemming from the need to combine business management with family responsibilities during emergencies.

The study also indicates that some business owners managed to develop various adaptation strategies to cope with the damage to business activity. Among other things, it emerged that some women moved to online activity, adapted their products or services to new needs, or reached out to additional target audiences. However, only about half of business owners managed to make adaptations of this kind, partly due to a shortage of financial resources, professional knowledge, or appropriate business support.

A further finding of the study is that access to government assistance during crisis periods was limited for a significant portion of business owners. About 42%–43% of women whose businesses were harmed during the COVID-19 crisis or during the October 7th war did not apply for a government grant, or wanted to apply but did not know how. In addition, some women who did apply for a grant did not actually receive assistance. These figures point to a gap between government assistance tools and the ability of very small business owners to make use of them.

The study indicates that small businesses owned by women operate within a particularly vulnerable economic framework in times of crisis. A combination of the characteristics of micro-businesses, structural gender gaps, and assistance policy that is not fully suited to very small businesses increases the vulnerability of women business owners during emergencies.

Given the contribution of these businesses to household livelihoods and to the economic resilience of communities, it is important to develop public policy that recognizes their unique characteristics and provides tailored responses. Strengthening assistance mechanisms, improving access to information, and better adapting support tools to very small businesses may contribute to business owners’ ability to cope with future crises and to strengthening Israel’s economic and social resilience.

Based on the study’s findings, several key recommendations for public policy are proposed:

• Systematic collection and publication of data on small businesses in Israel, broken down by gender;
• Establishment of a fast and simple-to-operate compensation mechanism for small business owners in times of crisis;
• Adapting eligibility conditions for government grants to businesses with low turnover that do not employ workers;
• Expanding assistance mechanisms for training and support in online commerce and digital marketing;
• Developing frameworks for business networking and strengthening cooperation among small business owners.

הפוסט Self-Employed Women Facing Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Even before the war, per-capita civilian spending in Israel was low compared with that of other developed countries; that is, public services operate under a persistent shortage of resources and personnel. Since the outbreak of the war with Hamas, public spending has expanded, but most of the increase was directed to emergency response, evacuation, compensation, and initial rehabilitation — not to strengthening broad, universal, and stable public services. In other words, even as the public budget grew, it did not strengthen the civilian base but served largely as a response to the state of emergency. The social price of the war is therefore not measured only in defense spending or war damage, but also in the gap between society’s needs and the ability of weakened civilian systems to provide an adequate response in the fields of housing, education, welfare, and health.

It is not only the war economy and the needs of security, emergency response, and initial rehabilitation that push civilian services down the budgetary priority list. Compounding this is a government that repeatedly chooses to make across-the-board cuts to these services, while at the same time budgeting for sectoral and contested goals: benefits for the ultra-Orthodox sector and the allocation of significant budgets to expanding the settlement enterprise, alongside across-the-board cuts to the budgets of government ministries generally and especially deep cuts to budgets earmarked for Arab society. This is a  policy resting on short-term coalition considerations, and its result is an ongoing erosion of the principle of universality of the welfare state.

Within this reality, the struggle against inequality cannot be postponed to the day after the war. The data presented in this report show that households entered this period from very different starting points: some rely on stable income, home ownership, savings, and capital income; others depend mainly on monthly wages, contend with a high cost of living and heavy rent costs, live in or near poverty, or were hurt by evacuation, reserve-duty call-ups, or damage to employment or a small business. These gaps also reflect differences between population groups and regions. Thus, Arab society in Israel, which suffers from persistent gaps in income, investment, infrastructure, and local development, is now also exposed to a public climate of hostility and suspicion that makes it harder to advance a policy of civic equality. In such a situation, inequality is not merely background data — it is one of the factors shaping the depth of the harm of war and the ability to recover from it.

Gaps in starting points are not only about current income from work. In times of crisis, home ownership, savings, and capital income serve as an economic safety net, while households that depend mainly on monthly wages are more exposed to loss of income, the growing cost of living, and unexpected expenses. Israel’s inequality is therefore not limited to wage gaps — it is also tied to the concentration of assets and capital income. This concentration is especially pronounced at the top of the income distribution: according to State Revenue Administration data, 82% of capital income is held by the top income decile, and 58% of it by the top income percentile alone. At this end of the distribution, capital is not merely an additional income source but a central mechanism for accumulating economic power.

This report seeks to return to the center of public discourse a question that has been pushed to the margins: how can a society cope with an ongoing crisis and recover from it without deepening the gaps within it? The data presented in the report indicate that an emergency response is not enough. Israel’s ability to cope also depends on its civilian base: on stable public services, broad economic security, and a policy that does not leave most of the burden on households. This is not a question that can be postponed to the day after the hostilities — it is a question that requires an answer here and now.

הפוסט Israel: A Social Report 2026 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Subsequent to the war, numerous surveys indicated increasing needs, on the one hand, and decreasing options for meeting those needs, whether the needs were of schoolchildren or adults, and whether the needs were for school councillors, social workers, psychologists or psychiatrists.

With regard to resilience centers, whose purpose is to provide emergency mental health care, their treatment schedules were curtailed, and the continuation of treatment at health funds for individuals in need was and still is limited by a shortage of personnel.

Everything boils down to money: Israel spends relatively little on public mental health care, evidenced by the percentage of the total budget for public health care budgeted and expended on mental health care. For example, during the years 2016-2021, the budget for public mental health services constituted no more than 4% of the expenditures on total  public health care , in 2022 it amounted to 5%, and during the years of the 2023 war, 6%, followed by 7% budgeted for 2025. However, that budget increase (following a war, it should be remembered), is not impressive when compared with the recommended 10% spending on mental health services in high-income OECD countries and with the actual percentage in western European countries, which is much higher — between 12% and 16%.

The present crisis in the treatment of individuals in need of mental health services is first and foremost a crisis of personnel, that is, the difficulty of attracting mental health specialists to the public services, and the shortage of positions in those services, as well as the need to define the number of patients to be treated by professionals in each specialty.

The main recruitment obstacle is the pay, which fails to reflect the investment required with regard to study and training, and is much lower than that in the private sector. It should be pointed out that the majority of public sector mental health workersare women; their inadequate pay contributes to the larger phenomenon of what we havereferred to in other studies as “the treatment deficit.” The shortage of personnel and of positions results in a huge workload, leading to further erosion and leakage of man and woman power from the public services.

The origin of this crisis is inadequate budgeting of the public services over the years, resulting in the inability to provide public mental health services in accordance with demand. Two serious crises that occurred in recent years – the corona epidemic and the October 7, 2023 war – resulted in a sharp increase in needs for such services on the part of the general population as well as of specific social groups – needs that the mental health and welfare services find it hard to meet. This situation is harmful especially to poverty-stricken families and individuals residing in the economic and geographical periphery of the country, where the services are even less accessible, but also to members of the middle class who may find private services beyond their means.

The Ministry of Health introduced a reform that included a budget increase, but its implemention remains partial, due mainly to an ongoing shortage of personnel. Following the 2023 war, mental health services were budgeted at 1.4 billion shekels for the years 2024-25, and in 2025 two labor agreements were signed that significantly increased the salaries of psychiatrists and psychologists employed in the public services. A similar amount was allocated to the Rehabilitation Department of the Defence Ministry, in charge of the treatment of soldiers. However, no solution was provided for the shortage of psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, educational psychologists and educational counselors.

Raising the salaries of psychiatrists and psychologists is an important step that has the potential to attract personnel to the public services, but it was taken very late, and it will take years to harvest the fruits of that move. Moreover, no decision was taken regarding how many patients were to be treated by each mental health expert, thus failing to deal with the huge burden experienced by each — and the subsequent erosion.

Against the background of mental health problems that arose or worsened due to the 2023 war and the social groups that were highly affected, among them reserve soldiers and residents dislocated from their homes, and the inability of the social services to answer the many calls for help, it is entirely likely that the problems will increase in severity. The steps taken to provide real time care, like crash courses for psychology graduates prior to their specialization and their inclusion in the cadre of treatment personnel, the creation of positions like trainers and supporters of mental fortitude, and chat-bots set up by the health funds, are no substitute for genuine professional treatment.

Mental health services cannot be dependent upon ad hoc solutions or emergency services, which are but poor substitutes for professional help: they need to be part and parcel of ongoing, long-term government services that are properly budgeted; otherwise the burden will remain on individual families and thousands of persons in need will remain without.

Translator’s note: This report was written prior to the Iran war, which has no doubt increased the needs described herein.

The full research in Hebrew is available here.

הפוסט The Serious Crisis of Mental Health Services in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Major Findings –

The Journey to Higher Education

The study points out that despite an increase in the rate of college students of Ethiopian origin, their representation in institutions of higher education is still lower than their representation in the general population, especially when it comes to advanced degrees. The route to higher education, it appears, is still a bumpy one.

Impediments to admission: The proportion of Ethiopian Israelis matriculating is close to that of the general Jewish population of Israel, but only 54% matriculate at a level high enough for admittance to institutes of higher learning, compared with 75% amongst Israeli Jews in general. Nearly all individuals interviewed had to improve their grades (either by retaking the matriculation exam or by enrolling in a pre-academic course of study) before they could be admitted to academia. Many mentioned the psychometric (college entrance) exam as a significant impediment, and indeed, the average grades of Ethiopian Israelis in the exam is lower by some 100 points than the average score of all those who take the entrance exams.

Choice of institution and major: More than four thousand Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in institutes of higher learning, constituting 1.4 % of all students. Relatively few pursue advanced degrees. In addition, they are under-represented at universities (vs colleges); only 24.1% of Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in universities, compared with 42.3% of all Jewish students. Regarding field of study, Ethiopian students are over-represented in social studies and administration, law, and auxiliary medical professions. In contrast, they are heavily under-represented in STEM professions, engineering and architecture.

First-generation academicians: All the interviewees in the study were the first generation in their families to receive a college degree; they described feelings of non-belonging and alienation, unfamiliarity with the academic system and significant differences between high school demands and academic demands. Many experienced covert or overt racism, low expectations and often loneliness, especially at universities (as opposed to colleges) and in situations in which they were the only persons from their ethnic background in a course of study. Their drop-out rate is relatively high — 25%, compared with 15% for Jewish students as a whole.

Economic hardship and its effect on studies: Most of the interviewees experienced ongoing economic hardship and needed to devote considerable time to work while studying, which often caused delays in completion of their degrees. Economic hardship also affected their choice of where to enroll; some chose the colleges that best enabled them to combine employment and study; however, that choice limited their possibilities of study and later employment.

Employment and integration difficulties: In 2020, only 0.6% of academicians in Israel were Ethiopian Israelis. The figure is low due to the small number of college graduates in the Ethiopian community, as well as to the difficulty of finding employment suitable to their expertise. Among those with bachelor’s degrees, only 18% worked in their fields, compared with 45% among the general population. Some interviewees expanded on how hard it was to translate their education into employment opportunities compatible with their education.

Academicians of Ethiopian origin are concentrated in economic sectors and occupations in which salaries are relatively low, in most cases lower than those of other minority groups. As such, they can be said to pay an “ethnic fine” – discrimination based on ethnic origin. There are many economic sectors in which hardly any Ethiopian Israelis are to be found, while their presence is significant in others — the public sector, health services, manufacturing and maintenance services.

Glass ceiling in the public sector: Despite the increase in representation of Ethiopian Israelis in the public services and local government, most occupy low-level positions and are under-represented in senior positions.

“Hyper visibility,” racism and stereotypes: High visibility intensifies differences in the workplace, as ethnic identity becomes the central factor regarding the worker, overshadowing skill, contribution and individual characteristics. The most salient phenomenon described by most of the interviewees was covert but consistent racism, reflected in lack of confidence in their professional abilities and in increased demands to prove their competence.

The culture of the Ethiopian community as an impediment, for example how hard it was to stand out and to market themselves “aggressively” as other Israelis do. Some defined theirs as “a culture of modesty” that limits one’s ability to dwell on their achievements and demand promotion.

The absence of employment networks and the types of connections needed for landing a job; the method of “friend brings friend” leaves Ethiopian Israelis out in the cold, especially in a situation in which very few Ethiopian Israelis occupy senior positions.

Affirmative action and organizational diversity: Despite awareness of the necessity of these employment strategies for increasing the presence of Ethiopian Israelis in senior positions and facilitating promotion, some mentioned that they might also act as a double-edged sword that reproduces labeling as a separate and inferior group.

The interviewees evinced determination to fight and not give up despite racism and discrimination. Strategies included refusing to work in hostile environments, even resigning to avoid them; viewing their own success as contributing to a change in the negative image of the community; directly confronting racist expressions, either with humor or aggression; or just ignoring or belittling unpleasant occurrences.

When asked what their recommendations were for young Ethiopian Israelis regarding education and employment, the main recommendations of most of the interviewees were “Get yourself a profession!” and “You will need to work twice as hard!”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Education

• Invest in improving the results of the matriculation exams of Ethiopian Israelis.
• Provide tutoring for college entrance exams.
• Direct prospective students to quality institutions and to professions for which there is demand.
• Expand economic assistance so that it includes living grants, especially for students enrolled at universities.

The Labor Market and the Public Sector

• Focus representation policy on promoting Ethiopian Israelis to senior positions in the public service and local government.
• Create clear lines of promotion and include Ethiopian Israelis in committees putting out tenders for senior positions.

Employers, Training and Employment Programs

• Raise the awareness of employers of the economic as well as the social advantages of diversity.
• Train personnel managers in diversity and inclusive work environments.
• Harness large and medium-sized employers to initiate diversity projects, with the involvement of the Ministry of Labor.
• Expand the “LaMerhak” career planning program for academicians, with an emphasis on students in colleges majoring in either the humanities or social studies.
• Promote the integration of Ethiopian Israelis into hi-tech industries and the education system.

The full research paper is available in Hebrew here (PDF).

הפוסט “You will need to work twice as hard”: From Higher Education to the Labor Market – The Trials and Tribulations of Ethiopian Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

An infographic presentation based on a study by the Adva Center in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on gender pay gaps in Israel.

הפוסט Why Is Women’s Pay Lower Than Men’s? Infographic Presentation הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

At a shindig organized by the Adva Center for the 80th birthday of an Adva Center co-founder (yours truly) a few years ago, Professor Shoshana Madmoni, who in the early 1990s helped to develop Adva, a new organization on the Israeli non-profit scene, presented me with a framed copy of the first brochure of lectures and workshops offered by Adva to high schools, colleges, central and local governmental bodies and non-profit organizations. These events emphasized equality between Israel’s social groups.

Some 25 years later, Adva is still working for greater equality, through research, advocacy, and yes, outreach events for similar, as well as different publics.

In the first six months of 2025, these outreach events centered mainly on gender mainstreaming public policy making and budgeting, poverty and inequality in various areas of life and in different parts of the country, and the design and implementation of the national budget.

Regarding gender mainstreaming, it was the Adva Center that brought and taught the theory and practice to the country — from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Australia – adapting it to local needs and conditions.

In recent months, Adva was to be found spreading the good word in three Arab localities: Tur’an, Shfaram and Beit Jann. To take one example, Tur’an is a low-income village of 15,000 residents, 80% of whom are Muslim and 20% Christian, located in the lower Galilee, on the road to Tiberias. The Adva event, implemented in cooperation with the Tur’an local authority and the non-profit organizations Itach-Maaki and Shatil, was attended by senior local officials; its purpose was to encourage gender mainstreaming in the work of the local government of Tur’an.

The study day featured Dr. Yael Hasson, executive director of Adva Center and an expert on gender issues, as the lead speaker. The response to the event was overwhelmingly positive, and one of the issues discussed was how to answer women’s need for public transportation.

And how can I not mention the infamous October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. And then the infamous Israel-Hamas war, which most Israelis hope is really, really over.

After which hopefully, despite all odds, equality within Israeli society can once again take front and center.

Best wishes,

Barbara Swirski

הפוסט Adva Advocates for Equality Everywhere הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

As the report itself states, this is hurtful employment: persons employed on an hourly basis earn less than those paid by the month, they have significantly fewer social benefits and it is easy to let them go.

The report is especially relevant today, as the compensation for workers adversely affected by Israel’s war with Iran is based on that implemented during the Gazan war and Corona epidemic, which neglects workers employed by the hour. In cases in which their working hours were reduced, they were not eligible for any compensation.

The median hourly pay for workers employed by the hour is NIS 48, compared with NIS 85 for workers employed on a monthly basis. Some 55% of workers employed by the hour have full-time jobs (defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics as at least 35 hours a week), and their salaries — NIS 46 per hour — are even lower than the average for workers employed part time. Moreover, in all the occupations included in the report that include a large percentage of workers paid by the hour, the workers earn less than workers paid by the month.

The highest proportion of workers paid by the hour can be found among waiters and barmen – 92%. As these are occupations in which mostly young people and students are employed and they involve high turnover, pay by the hour may be justified. However, other occupations in which hourly pay is common do not involve young, temporary workers and high turnover. The reference is to nursing care workers, most of them older women, 80% of whom are paid by the hour; cleaners, (75% of them employed by contrastors and paid by hour); transport and storage workers, mostly men, 70% of whom are paid by the hour; salespersons (66% paid hourly), as well as 60% of salesclerks in stores and 56% of nursery school aides.

Employment by the hour is justified as “flexible employment”. However, due to the extent of its usage, it has become a common method of employment that involves low wages and avoids the payment of proper workplace social rights. As expected, it is utilized for workers with low bargaining power, most of whom have a low level of education and are devoid of occupational skills — workers that include a high representation of Arabs and young people (23% of each). However, hourly employment is not limited to these social groups: Amongst hourly employees, 34% are parents of children up to the age of 14. This constitutes a huge proportion of wage earners working without employment security or a fixed number of hours.

Finally, the employment sectors in which hourly pay has taken root are also characterized by difficulties in recruiting workers – among them nursing care workers and teaching aides. These employees vote with their feet, frequently seeking more stable employment. Thus, public services suffer as well as employers, as the latter forego employment stability in favor of the financial gain they expect from cheap labor.

As it turns out, the situation is dismal: Employment by the hour has become a widely used method for simply reducing the cost of labor.  It is harmful, exploitative and unethical, and in the long run not necessarily economically advantageous. Due to the frequency of the use of employment by the hour, it is high time for Israel to pass a law limiting it to part-time or temporary jobs.

הפוסט Employment by the Hour is Harmful Employment הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.