Subsequent to the war, numerous surveys indicated increasing needs, on the one hand, and decreasing options for meeting those needs, whether the needs were of schoolchildren or adults, and whether the needs were for school councillors, social workers, psychologists or psychiatrists.

With regard to resilience centers, whose purpose is to provide emergency mental health care, their treatment schedules were curtailed, and the continuation of treatment at health funds for individuals in need was and still is limited by a shortage of personnel.

Everything boils down to money: Israel spends relatively little on public mental health care, evidenced by the percentage of the total budget for public health care budgeted and expended on mental health care. For example, during the years 2016-2021, the budget for public mental health services constituted no more than 4% of the expenditures on total  public health care , in 2022 it amounted to 5%, and during the years of the 2023 war, 6%, followed by 7% budgeted for 2025. However, that budget increase (following a war, it should be remembered), is not impressive when compared with the recommended 10% spending on mental health services in high-income OECD countries and with the actual percentage in western European countries, which is much higher — between 12% and 16%.

The present crisis in the treatment of individuals in need of mental health services is first and foremost a crisis of personnel, that is, the difficulty of attracting mental health specialists to the public services, and the shortage of positions in those services, as well as the need to define the number of patients to be treated by professionals in each specialty.

The main recruitment obstacle is the pay, which fails to reflect the investment required with regard to study and training, and is much lower than that in the private sector. It should be pointed out that the majority of public sector mental health workersare women; their inadequate pay contributes to the larger phenomenon of what we havereferred to in other studies as “the treatment deficit.” The shortage of personnel and of positions results in a huge workload, leading to further erosion and leakage of man and woman power from the public services.

The origin of this crisis is inadequate budgeting of the public services over the years, resulting in the inability to provide public mental health services in accordance with demand. Two serious crises that occurred in recent years – the corona epidemic and the October 7, 2023 war – resulted in a sharp increase in needs for such services on the part of the general population as well as of specific social groups – needs that the mental health and welfare services find it hard to meet. This situation is harmful especially to poverty-stricken families and individuals residing in the economic and geographical periphery of the country, where the services are even less accessible, but also to members of the middle class who may find private services beyond their means.

The Ministry of Health introduced a reform that included a budget increase, but its implemention remains partial, due mainly to an ongoing shortage of personnel. Following the 2023 war, mental health services were budgeted at 1.4 billion shekels for the years 2024-25, and in 2025 two labor agreements were signed that significantly increased the salaries of psychiatrists and psychologists employed in the public services. A similar amount was allocated to the Rehabilitation Department of the Defence Ministry, in charge of the treatment of soldiers. However, no solution was provided for the shortage of psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, educational psychologists and educational counselors.

Raising the salaries of psychiatrists and psychologists is an important step that has the potential to attract personnel to the public services, but it was taken very late, and it will take years to harvest the fruits of that move. Moreover, no decision was taken regarding how many patients were to be treated by each mental health expert, thus failing to deal with the huge burden experienced by each — and the subsequent erosion.

Against the background of mental health problems that arose or worsened due to the 2023 war and the social groups that were highly affected, among them reserve soldiers and residents dislocated from their homes, and the inability of the social services to answer the many calls for help, it is entirely likely that the problems will increase in severity. The steps taken to provide real time care, like crash courses for psychology graduates prior to their specialization and their inclusion in the cadre of treatment personnel, the creation of positions like trainers and supporters of mental fortitude, and chat-bots set up by the health funds, are no substitute for genuine professional treatment.

Mental health services cannot be dependent upon ad hoc solutions or emergency services, which are but poor substitutes for professional help: they need to be part and parcel of ongoing, long-term government services that are properly budgeted; otherwise the burden will remain on individual families and thousands of persons in need will remain without.

Translator’s note: This report was written prior to the Iran war, which has no doubt increased the needs described herein.

The full research in Hebrew is available here.

הפוסט The Serious Crisis of Mental Health Services in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The survey illustrates and validates what was already known to aid organizations: over half of the respondents reported feeling financial distress “often”, a rate that is comparable to poverty when applying the official approach in Israel. The level of food insecurity among this population is disturbingly high: approximately 85% experience food insecurity, and 55% experience severe food insecurity. A substantial proportion of their monthly income is spent on housing, while many report poor health conditions due to limited access to health insurance coverage.

The reviewed findings highlight the state’s need to improve the situation of the refugee and asylum seeker population and, indirectly, to improve the situation of Israeli society as a whole. Among the policy proposals mentioned in this document, we note a proposal to implement a mechanism for regularly collecting data on this population to monitor their situation and its improvement according to the desired policy measures; action must be taken to alleviate the suffering of refugees in Israel by providing essential assistance, even if partial, in the areas of social security, housing, a basic package of welfare and health services, and more – until the desired realization of their official refugee status.

Our thanks to Dr. Yuval Livnat, Etty Konor-Attias and Dr. Yael Hasson from the Adva Center, and Tali Ehrenthal (MSW), Hadar Aviel, Zameret Hershco (MSW), Adv. Orly Levinson Sela and Mika Foux from ASSAF, for their helpful comments and support.

Special thanks to the team of the ‘Mesila’ – Aid and Information Centre for Migrant Workers and Refugees at the Tel Aviv–Yafo Municipality, for their partnership in the data collection for this research.

Translated to English by: Lea Dovrat

This publication was co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Adva Center and ASSAF, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

This report was also made possible thanks to the support of MAZON: A Jewish Response to Hunger.

הפוסט The Poor Who Don’t Count: Poverty, Food Security and Economic Well-being among Asylum Seekers in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A whole day was devoted to discussions on social housing, in which the Adva Center played a central role as a leading research and advocacy institute that is deeply involved in housing policy, including social housing in Israel. The thrust of Adva’s remarks was a call to significantly increase the stock of social as well as affordable housing.  It should be noted that Adva has for many years and continues to advocate for the right of all individuals living in Israel to have a safe and stable roof over their heads.

Some ten different parliamentary committees held meetings centered on the issue of social housing. At the main event, led by MKs Lazimi and Biton, the emphasis was on the demand for immediate improvement in social housing policy, including changes in eligibility rules and an increase in the number of apartments available. During the same day, two exhibitions were on display at the Knesset, one entitled “It Could be Better,” in which photographs showed the contrast between Israel’s social housing, obviously suffering from neglect, and well-kept social housing in Austria and Scandinavian countries. Another exhibition, entitled “Lionesses,” featured photos and stories of women living in social housing who are untiringly fighting for their rights.

Adva researcher Yaron Hoffmann-Dishon took part in three different discussions, including the main event, where he presented findings from studies of the budgeting trends of housing in Israel in recent decades. The figures testify to the fact that while state income from real estate taxes and land sales reached new heights in recent years, state investment in housing underwent erosion. Hoffmann-Dishon’s comments in committee discussions revealed that while the real estate market has become an important source of national income, the national investment in the various types of housing assistance has been on the decline, at the same time that the social housing stock, which suffers from neglect, continues to decrease.

Adva researcher and policy advocate Tehila Sharabi, who took part in the discussion organized by the Knesset Committee for Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women, presented the implications of housing policy for gender inequality, emphasizing its effects on women from disadvantaged social groups and women suffering from family violence; for the latter, the lack of accessible, suitable and safe housing forces them to choose between the devil of remaining in violent situations or the deep blue sea of becoming homeless. Sharabi emphasized the need to develop programs that would offer long-term housing solutions for abused women.

הפוסט Adva Center Promoting Social Housing: ‘Public Housing Day’ in the Knesset – 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A recent Adva Center study revealed that close to a third (28.5%) of employed persons in the northern and southern districts earn low salaries, compared with less than a fifth (17.5%) of employed persons in the central area of the country.

Below are some of the budget cuts planned for 2025, all of which are expected to have a negative effect onlow wage workers:

1. Placing a freeze on negative income until 2027. (Retracted) 
2. Placing a freeze on child allowances until the end of 2025. These allowances, paid to mothers, reflect at least a minimal recognition of the cost of raising children. They constitute a significant source of income for households in the lower income deciles, and the failure to link them to rises in the cost of living will widen inequality.
3. Increasing the lower level of the national insurance (social security) tax . This tax hike will lower take-home pay, and will, of course, affect low-income workers more than others. Women constitute 65% of low earners and will thus bear the brunt of the tax hike.
4. Initiating across-the-board budget cuts in the public services – to the tune of some 6.5 billion shekels. These cuts will affect, among others, Israel’s education, healthcare and social welfare systems; they will be sorely felt not only by women living in poverty, who are almost entirely dependent on public services, but also on lower middle class households.

Dislocated Persons from the South and the North of Israel Will be Especially Affected by the Absence of Relevant Policy

A study recently published by the Adva Center showed that the continued dislocation of Israelis from their homes resulted in the desolation of communities; it also forced numerous households to move from place to place and resulted in employment as well as personal crises.

The extended residence of displaced individuals and families in hotels also extracted a heavy price. Parents reported a loss of authority, among others due to the lack of stable educational frameworks; adults and senior citizens coped with forced inactivity and in some cases isolation from their families. The longer the hotel stay, the more invidious its effects. When the time comes for displaced households to return to their homes, the experience of dislocation is liable to affect the capability of internal refugees to forgo dependence and return to normal life.   It should be noted that a possible result of a too-early cessation of financial assistance for housing, unemployment, and businesses for those adversely affected by displacement, may very well have implications for the economic resilience of households and whole communities and result in increased poverty in the North and South of Israel.

Poverty and Debt in Arab Society in Israel

Most Arabs in Israel live in separate rather than mixed Jewish-Arab localities, and many Arab localities are to be found in the North and South of Israel.

In recent years, against the background of the high cost of living and increased interest rates,  a debt crisis has developed among Arab households. These households are more likely than Jewish households to experience economic distress (In 2022, 39% of Arab families lived in poverty, compared with 16% of Jewish families). This situation has led to a type of double jeopardy:  as institutional credit is not readily accessible to Arab citizens, they are dependent on the gray market, which does offer loans, but at high interest rates and danger to life and livelihood if the loans are not repaid in time. This situation not only creates and exacerbates the debt crisis, but also buttresses organized crime, which takes full advantage of the economic distress in Arab society for its own gain.

A study conducted by the Adva Center found that in 2021, 7.9% of Jewish households were in debt, compared with 19.4% of Arab households. Despite this situation, Arabs were under-represented in insolvency rehabilitation programs, and the average time it took to return a loan for Arabs was fully 18 times longer than for Jews, despite the fact that Arabs’ loans were smaller.

Protecting the Poor in the Periphery: Policy Recommendations

Adva Center recommends initiation of a broad-based policy of economic rehabilitation and debt servicing assistance. In addition, we recommend the initiation of a multi-year strategy whose goal is to rehabilitate those who were uprooted from their homes in the North and South of Israel. In the short-run, we call on the government to adopt the following recommendations:

1. To cancel the proposed budget cuts proposed by the Ministry of Finance, as they will have harmful effects on low-income workers, and to consider in their stead raising tax rates for high earners and on profits on capital investments. In the middle and long run, the negative income tax for parents should be significantly increased.
2. To design non-profit programs to provide credit accessibility for low-income persons, on better terms than those currently available. This can be effected by utilizing the Postal Bank or by creating a fund on the basis of monies obtained following criminal proceedings against those who break the law mandating fair credit terms.
3. To continue to support individuals and families displaced by the October 2023 war, with existing or new allowances. This can be done, for example, by utilizing the mechanism of the Victims of Hostile Actions Law of 1970, via a temporary order.

הפוסט In the Absence of a Broad-based Economic Rehabilitation Policy, Poverty in Israel is Expected to Grow הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

For women who experience domestic violence, the absence of accessible, suitable alternative housing leaves them with only two choices:  to remain at home, where they continue to suffer from violence or to become homeless. In other words, for many, escaping violence means the loss of housing.

In April 2024, the Adva Center, together with the Forum for Public Housing and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, presented a position paper to the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of Women entitled, “Expanding Housing Assistance Mechanisms for Women Survivor of Violence and their Children”. The paper demonstrated how the absence of alternative housing gave abused women and their children no choice but to remain in dangerous home environments.

The fact that in Israel, domestic violence does not constitute a criterion for eligibility for social housing means that the only option for abused women is to receive housing assistance for rent from the Ministry of Construction and Housing. This assistance is predicated on having spent time in a shelter for women survivors of domestic violence, which means that women who could not find a place in a shelter or whose husbands received a court order to stay away from the family home but did not honor it were not eligible. In addition, financial assistance from the Ministry is available for no more than three years. The first year of assistance is awarded without many strings attached, but subsequent years involve presenting proof that the potential recipient is devoid of housing options. According to information supplied to the Knesset Center for Information and Research by the Ministry, if the woman and her husband are joint owners of an apartment in which the husband resides, whose value has yet to be divided between the spouses, the woman’s eligibility for housing assistance will be renewed.

According to a report published by the OECD in 2023, most countries provide survivors of violence with emergency shelter for a short period; however, in most countries, the demand is greater than the supply. The same report indicates that some states provide transitional housing for longer periods than in Israel. For example, in Hungary, there are transitional apartments located close to centers for the treatment of domestic violence that offer housing for up to five years. Figures published in 2019 indicate that the average stay in those apartments is two years, after which the women rent on the private market or receive social housing.

Some OECD member states, among them Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Japan and Australia, give precedence to survivors of domestic violence when it comes to eligibility for social housing. This policy could be adopted by Israel as well.

הפוסט Housing Opportunities for Women Survivors of Domestic Violence in Israel and in OECD Member States הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

After the coronavirus pandemic, food security in unrecognized villages worsened. Societal infrastructures had to reassess their capacity under large-scale emergency stress. In the unrecognized villages of the Negev, exploratory research conducted in the first year and published in September 2023 highlighted how the lack of infrastructure, particularly water and electricity, directly affects residents’ food security (in Hebrew). The war that began on October 7th, 2023, and the exploratory research findings prompted us to continue using qualitative methods for this study. The subsequent findings resulted from 21 semi-structured interviews conducted in seven villages deprived of recognition. Based on these findings, we recommend developing an emergency plan for situations when the movement of Bedouin people is restricted to their villages; otherwise, future emergencies could lead to starvation.

Chapter one examines the consequences of the October 2023 war on food security in unrecognized villages. First, a traditional food rationing system in these villages, used in times of crisis, tends to promote isolationism. Second, at the war’s onset, tourism-related jobs and employment along the Gaza border ceased, which were the primary sources of income for women in the villages. Third, the war drove up the cost of living, reducing the variety of products available, mainly fresh fruits, vegetables, and meat. The loss of income, rising cost of living, and increased socioeconomic isolation has severely impacted the regular food supply in households. These three effects of the ongoing war are expected to undermine food security and compound into worsening long-term health issues.

Chapter two addresses the measuring of food security in unrecognized villages. The interviewees noted that discussing food insecurity is considered shameful in Bedouin society. Shame complicates access to accurate quantitative measurements of Bedouin food insecurity. Additionally, the approach to identifying food insecurity differs from that of most people in Israel. Some interviewees described reliance on the land and living modestly as a healthy Bedouin tradition. For instance, in response to a standard food security questionnaire, “Did you skip a meal in the last two weeks?” the answers are likely to be negative, as olive oil in pita bread is regarded as a meal. Food security questionnaires must be tailored to local contexts, or else connotative discrepancies can lead to inaccurate results.

Chapter three examines the gendered division of labor concerning food security within the household. Traditionally, women leave their homes to move into a home within the men’s community. It is important to note that the Bedouin household is traditionally organized as a network instead of a nuclear unit. Dependents frequently experience flexibility within their family structure. As a result, the husband’s extended family dependents may live in the husband’s household. Gender-based power dynamics within the home are typically dictated by conservative patriarchal norms that enforce gender roles in the context of food security. Women are expected to perform domestic and reproductive labor, while men are expected to be the breadwinners. Both gendered labors attribute to food security in the household.

The conclusion emphasizes the need for comprehensive research and locally focused policy. Regarding research, conducting studies that resonate with the culture and challenges of daily life in each village is recommended instead of relying on standard food security questionnaires. Furthermore, it is essential to adapt measurements and responses to reflect the perceptions of Bedouin villagers and ensure that all questions are tailored with gender sensitivity. Regarding policy, protocols must be established to protect Bedouin villagers from starvation in emergencies and non-emergencies. A consistent and storable source of fresh food must be developed to promote self-sufficiency. During non-emergency periods, it is advisable to adopt a flexible definition of the household, ensuring it includes everyone who may share a meal. Lastly, we strongly advocate for integrating women into stable employment that aligns with their customs and raising awareness of food security in high schools as teenagers start taking active roles in their households.

הפוסט Food Insecurity in Bedouin Villages Deprived of Recognition in the Negev Region of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Still, the first decades of statehood were characterized, among others, by attempts to develop social welfare services based on the Scandinavian social-democratic model of the time: one that would provide subsidies, services and/or cash payments to citizens who were in need due to unemployment, lack of training, parenthood, illness, injury, age or other permanent or changing life circumstances. The creation of a welfare state was part and parcel of the very nation-building process.

It took some 30 years to finalize the process of social welfare legislation, with the passage of the Long-Term Care Act in 1982.

It took only three years before the process of dis-investment was initiated by adherents of neo-liberalism.

Israel’s financial crisis of 1985, which provided the impetus for the Economic Stabilization Program, involving, among others, budget cuts, privatization of public services and tax reductions[1] — as well as subsequent events, notably the Second Intifada (2000-2005), led to retrenchment of the social-democratic model, in favor of a very different model, one that had already taken hold in the United Kingdom and the United States: a neo-liberal model. As is well known, social services are financed by taxation or other sources of government income. While the social-democratic model is based on relatively high, progressive taxation, the neo-liberal model aspires to low taxation and minimal public services, especially social welfare services. It favors small government and big business.

In Israel, 2002 marked the decisive victory of what has come to resemble the neoliberal model of a welfare state, over the more generous, social-democratic model — against the background of the second Intifada, increased terrorist activity, an economic crisis, and what Maron and Shalev[2] term “an unusually favorable government coalition,” which provided the political opportunity for the Ministry of Finance to impose cuts and limitations on many cash benefits.

Under the new model, potential recipients of “social welfare services” no longer referred to the majority of the population, who, in accordance with the idea of social-democracy were to receive from the state or the local authority services, subsidies and monetary transfers in accordance with need; rather, “social welfare services” (not including social security) were to be limited primarily to individuals and families located at the bottom of the income ladder and who lacked the wherewithal to benefit from a reasonable standard of living.

The October 7, 2023 massacre and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza, among others, have made many Israelis aware that the time has come for changes that will benefit all citizens, especially those at the bottom of the income ladder (let us say, the bottom 10%) in times of peace, as well as all those adversely affected in times of hostility or crisis. The only way to bring about such change is to require the top 10% to contribute more to the general welfare of their countrymen and women.

הפוסט The Bottom 10 Percent Needs the Top 10 Percent: Social Welfare Services in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The inactivity of young Arabs has repercussions beyond those for the individuals themselves. Inactivity leads to a decrease in feelings of capability, faulty interpersonal skills, social isolation, depression and economic burdens on households. Inactivity perpetuates socio-economic gaps, increases poverty levels and burdens community social services.[1] Finally, there is a correlation between the high percentage of inactive Arab youth and the high crime rate among members of this group.

According to the State Comptroller’s Report,  there is a disturbing gap between Arab and Jewish youth:  25% of young male Arabs and 34% of young female Arabs are to be found in the catetory of inactive young people, compared with 14% of young male Jews and 17% of young female Jews. Moreover, according to the report, Arab Youth in Israel (2023), some 40.5% of Arabs between the ages of 18 and 24 are below the poverty line, compared with 14.8% of Jews in the same age group.[2] Since the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” war, there has been a significant decrease in employment among Arabs; thus the poverty rate among Arab youth is expected to rise even higher.

The economic distress experienced by inactive young Arabs often leads to involvement in criminal activity; 48.6% of the criminal cases filed against persons aged 18-24 involve Arabs,[3] which is much higher than their percentage of the population in this age group (30%).[4]  In serious cases, criminal activity is liable to deteriorate into organized crime or terrorist actions.

For the very purpose of preventing such eventualities, the Israeli government earmarked 1.4 billion shekels for initiatives to provide employment opportunities for young Arabs, focusing on the development of professional skills, increasing Hebrew language proficiency and obtaining employment.  This program is central for dealing with the problem of inactive Arab youth, and it is expected to reduce the threat of falling into crime and violence.

This is a decisive moment in Israel’s responsibility for Arab society as well as for Israel as a whole. A budget cut in the 5-year plan – especially the planned cut of 15% — according to the revised budget for 2024 – is liable to negate the progress made to date and to increase the level of violence in Arab society.

// The English version of this article was originally published in The Times of Israel, on 21 February 2024.

הפוסט Proposed budget cuts will have an adverse effect on Arab youth הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Given the challenges associated with the maintenance and adequacy of numerous public and shared shelters, the primary and widely endorsed solution to ensure effective protection for the entire population is the construction of a mamad within residential units. This aligns with the directives of the Home Front Command, emphasizing that “Mamad provides the best response against the threat of rockets and missiles.”

Yet, the level of protection of the population is affected, among other things, by discriminatory planning policies and unequal allocation of resources.

In 1992, it has been mandated that every new residential construction includes a mamad. However, a considerable number of residential units constructed before 1992 lack adequate protection. Notably, there is a correlation between income levels and the presence of mamad-equipped apartments, as more affluent households, typically residing in newer developments, have a higher likelihood of having them. Consequently, there is a higher proportion of households with mamads in the higher income deciles, whereas the lower income deciles exhibit a lower percentage of households without such protection.

Presently, the primary strategy for increasing protection in existing apartments across much of the country revolves around urban renewal plans, with a particular emphasis on initiatives rooted in TMA 38 that was originally designed to strengthen buildings against earthquakes and not for protection against rocket fire. The fact that the possibility of urban renewal plans depend on economic feasibility and the potential for entrepreneurial profit left out of the plan many apartments in Israel, mainly in the periphery.

Addressing the challenge of safeguarding residential apartments in Israel comprehensively and over the long term requires an integrated strategy that includes strengthening against earthquakes and restoration of old buildings, within a broader policy of housing equality nationwide. Such a policy, which will be devoid of profit-driven motives and based on direct state investment, is the only a viable alternative to relinquishing the responsibility for protection, specifically in housing matters, to the ‘private market’.

Protection of residents of the conflict line communities in the north and south

Even the government policy of financing the construction of shelters in localities very close to the border suffers from under-budgeting and under-implementation. Apart from localities in the ‘Gaza Envelope’ within a range of up to 7 km from the Gaza border, in more distant localities, the proportion of unprotected apartments is relatively high, and the budget for construction of shelters is insufficient.

The city of Ashkelon, located beyond the 7 km range, and thus excluded from the shelters budgeting plan, has become a primary target for rocket attacks.  In March 2022, the government approved a plan to protect Ashkelon from trajectory-based attacks, allocating a budget of 320 million NIS over a 5-year period. Astonishingly, a mere two weeks (!) after publishing the detailed implementation plan, on July 30, 2023, the government issued a new decision that not only froze and shelved the outlined measures but also significantly curtailed funding for loans and grants earmarked for constructing mamads in the city. In fact, the government once again shifted the primary responsibility for safeguarding the city to urban renewal programs.

The Bedouin population of the Negev is particularly under protected.  The lack of shelters in the Bedouin communities results not only from the economic inability of this population to finance the construction of protected spaces, but also a result of the discrimination and neglect that characterize the government policy towards the Bedouin and Arab population in Israel.

In contrast to the communities in the Gaza Envelope, where a protection project and mamads construction were implemented in line with government decisions made in 2008 and 2012, localities along the northern border suffer from notable deficiencies in protection. According to the State Comptroller’s report, in 2018 there were 11,400 apartments lacking standard shielding in localities situated less than 4 km from the borders of Lebanon and Syria (15% of all residences in these areas). The Comptroller’s report highlighted a particularly critical situation in Arab communities in the north, that suffer from a low rate of residential protection, but also from a severe lack of public shelters.

As part of the budget proposal for the years 2023-2024 approved by the Knesset in May 2023, the budget for the “Defense of the North” program was significantly cut, and was set – under the new name “Defense of the Homeland” – to 68 million NIS in 2023 and 63 million NIS in 2024 (at 2022 prices). Although these amounts were similar to the executed amounts of the plan in previous years, they are much lower than the budget allocated for the implementation of the plan in 2022, and even lower than the original target set by the political-security cabinet, which was NIS 500 million per year.

הפוסט Shelters under market conditions: Residential shelters in Israel subjected to the ‘private market’ interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

“It is crucial that a plan be designed for emergency situations in which residents of the villages are unable to access foodstuffs outside of their villages. Such situations will result in real hunger, as it appears to have occurred among some families during the Covid-19 epidemic.” (published in Hebrew, here)

Indeed, when the present war with Hamas broke out, civil society organizations working in the Negev warned that residents of the unrecognized villages were on the brink of hunger. Even during normal times, they cope with food insecurity, along with lack of infrastructure, access roads and regular provision of water and electricity. Food insecurity in the villages stems from, among others, the need to go elsewhere in order to obtain the necessities of life. Thus, in times of emergency, when it is impossible to go outside the villages, the danger of hunger is imminent.

Civil society organizations have tried to make up for the inaccessibility of necessities – collecting and delivering foodstuffs to a distribution point in the village of Hura, but their volunteers contend that distress is rampant, and civil society initiatives will not be able to supply the enormous needs for long. They are calling on the state to act to prevent hunger both immediately and in the long run.

Like other residents of the Negev, Bedouin residents suffered terrible losses following the Hamas attacks. At least 19 Bedouin citizens of Israel were murdered on the bloody day of October 7, 2023, among them a grandmother and her granddaughter from a missile that hit the village of Kochla. Others were murdered when they tried to save persons injured by missiles, and still others as they laboured in the fields of the Israeli townships around the Gaza Strip. In addition, six Bedouin citizens of Israel are among the kidnapped and missing, four of them from the same family – a father and sons who accompanied him to his job at the Holit Kibbutz. The body of another person who went missing – Amar Odah Abu Svila – a young man 25 years old — was murdered when he rescued two Jewish toddlers from Hamas bullets while they were in a family vehicle near the police station in the city of Sderot.

Neglect of residents of the unrecognized villages is outrageous. On October 7, 2023 – the day of the Hamas attacks, those villages did not have rapid-response squads, safe rooms or bomb shelters. The Iron Dome protective system defines the area in which the villages are located as “open areas” rather than “populated areas”, and thus missiles fired in their direction were not intercepted. In addition, in the absence of electrical infrastructure, air raid sirens were not regularly sounded. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel asked the relevant ministers and the Home Front Command to bring prefabricated bomb shelters and to set up alarm systems in the villages. On October 18, 2023, the Ministry for Social Equality announced that together with the Home Front Command, it would act to “close the protection gaps in the Negev Bedouin diaspora.”

The security threat prevents Bedouin citizens residing in the Negev from purchasing necessities, thus creating a threat of food insecurity and even hunger, which is liable to exacerbate if the present war continues. As if this were not bad enough, many of these citizens also lost their sources of income, making it difficult to purchase foodstuffs even if they were able to move freely and go to nearby towns with grocery stores.

הפוסט Lessons of the Covid-19 Epidemic Forgotten: Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev Face Hunger הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.