At a shindig organized by the Adva Center for the 80th birthday of an Adva Center co-founder (yours truly) a few years ago, Professor Shoshana Madmoni, who in the early 1990s helped to develop Adva, a new organization on the Israeli non-profit scene, presented me with a framed copy of the first brochure of lectures and workshops offered by Adva to high schools, colleges, central and local governmental bodies and non-profit organizations. These events emphasized equality between Israel’s social groups.

Some 25 years later, Adva is still working for greater equality, through research, advocacy, and yes, outreach events for similar, as well as different publics.

In the first six months of 2025, these outreach events centered mainly on gender mainstreaming public policy making and budgeting, poverty and inequality in various areas of life and in different parts of the country, and the design and implementation of the national budget.

Regarding gender mainstreaming, it was the Adva Center that brought and taught the theory and practice to the country — from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Australia – adapting it to local needs and conditions.

In recent months, Adva was to be found spreading the good word in three Arab localities: Tur’an, Shfaram and Beit Jann. To take one example, Tur’an is a low-income village of 15,000 residents, 80% of whom are Muslim and 20% Christian, located in the lower Galilee, on the road to Tiberias. The Adva event, implemented in cooperation with the Tur’an local authority and the non-profit organizations Itach-Maaki and Shatil, was attended by senior local officials; its purpose was to encourage gender mainstreaming in the work of the local government of Tur’an.

The study day featured Dr. Yael Hasson, executive director of Adva Center and an expert on gender issues, as the lead speaker. The response to the event was overwhelmingly positive, and one of the issues discussed was how to answer women’s need for public transportation.

And how can I not mention the infamous October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. And then the infamous Israel-Hamas war, which most Israelis hope is really, really over.

After which hopefully, despite all odds, equality within Israeli society can once again take front and center.

Best wishes,

Barbara Swirski

הפוסט Adva Advocates for Equality Everywhere הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Dr. Shani Bar-On and Ms. Tehila Sharabi of the Adva Center presented concrete recommendations for policies that would have the best chance of leading to full recovery in the areas affected by the war.

The conference aimed to promote policies based on the experience, the knowledge and the involvement of the displaced individuals themselves. The recommendations presented were based on research conducted by the Adva Center among individuals displaced since October 7, 2023, at state initiative, for an extended period of time: The Trials and Tribulations of Israelis Who Became Refugees in Their Own Land.

הפוסט Knesset Conference: “It Won’t Work without Us” הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

We at Adva Center celebrate the publication of this official report that focuses on enhancing gender equality in local authorities; it constitutes no less than recognition of the importance of the issue for social resilience and democracy in Israel. It is no secret that the local authority is a central arena of decision-making: Local policies, priorities and resource allocation have a direct influence on the lives of residents. For this reason, implementation of the principle of gender equality into local governance is of decisive importance, as local governments are employers whose behavior affects local employees as well as being entities whose decisions and resource allocations have a direct impact on persons residing in the locality.

The findings of the report, based on an extensive, in-depth analysis, point to, among others, the need for local governments to create strategic plans to increase gender equality as well as annual and long-term work plans that include measurable outcomes, including the reduction of gender gaps in the appointment of senior officials and the determination of salaries, the strengthening of the position of gender equality advisor, among others by providing her with greater support and increased resources for her crucial work. Other elements of the recommended plans: improving data gathering processes in localities and promoting gender analysis of local budgets.

הפוסט A Feather in Adva’s Cap: State Comptroller Report on Promoting Gender Equality in Local Government הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

A new file obtained by the Adva Center from the Department of Demography and Census at the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics contributes to a partial understanding of the changes that have occurred. A study just published by Adva gives a taste of some of the insights one can derive from this kind of analysis.

Among others, the study reveals a salient difference in the pattern of the evacuations and the movement of the populations with regard to their locality of origin. The most extreme example of dispersion is Kiryat Shemona, which was formally evacuated on October 20, 2023, and whose residents relocated in more than 180 different localities throughout Israel, from Eilat in the very south of Israel, northwards.

In contrast, there is a model of concentrated and relatively organized evacuation, which characterizes small, collective localities, as well as localities that were hit hardest on October 7, 2023. Their evacuations were generally collective – with the exception of individuals who preferred or had no choice but to relocate somewhere else. We assume that the form of evacuation and relocation taken were connected to additional characteristics of the original locality – like their degree of solidarity and type of organization prior to the war. Sadly, a locality that evacuated in a dispersed way will probably find it difficult to preserve a feeling of belonging to the locality and the community, as well as to re-establish social relations in anticipation of a return.

At the end of April 2024, more than one percent of the population of Israel (117,500 persons) had experienced evacuation. The largest population change of localities that absorbed evacuees, in relation to their original population, was experienced by regional councils — which are aggregates of small localities and, as such, had fewer inhabitants to begin with than other local entities. At the same time, it can be seen that the population of cities was enhanced by a larger percentage than the population of the regional councils. Examining the data at two different points in time, one can see that evacuees continued to move from place to place.

The state of Israel needs to take responsibility for the evacuees, not only at their moment of evacuation but for the duration of the time of their displacement. The absence of a continuous and transparent mapping of the movement of Israel’s internal refugees and the manner of their absorption with regard to the social services they receive has an adverse effect on the ability of the local authorities – as well as that of the national government — to respond effectively to the needs of the evacuees. We recommend that the government conduct a regular and continuous mapping of population movements and of the responses to the evacuees provided by all types of local authorities.

הפוסט The Refiguring of Israel in the Wake of October 7, 2023 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The following budget analysis is for local governments included in the “Gaza envelope,” whose definition entitles them to special allocations from the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant localities are the city Sderot, the regional councils Sha’ar HaNegev, Eshkol, Hof Ashkelon and Sdot Negev. The budget allocations presented below include assistance to be transferred, via the Ministry of the Interior, to the local tax base and other special grants, including development grants whose purpose is to strengthen the area. These allocations were instituted following Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014). In the following graph, we present the total government budget transferred to the local governments via the Ministry of the Interior, in accordance with government resolutions.

Examining the national budget for the years 2023-2024 provides painful evidence that the localities in question were indeed slated for abandonment following the November 2022 elections. The total government allocation approved for the localities for 2023 and 2024, of NIS 99 million, is significantly lower than the budgets allocated and actually spent during the previous years. For example, for the years 2021 and 2022, those allocations amounted to NIS 140.5 and 137.8 million NIS, respectively.

Examining allocations transferred for the purpose of strengthening the localities of the “Gaza envelope” by budget per resident provides an even clearer picture. The following graph shows that between 2014 and 2022, the central government budget per resident was similar: NIS 1,579 at the beginning of the period and NIS 1,557 at the end. Recall that after Operation Protective Edge (2014) there were four more rounds of fighting. Despite this fact, the budgets approved for 2023 and 2024 are lower by 31% than that of 2022.

The figures show that The “Gaza envelope” area was defined following the rockets fired into it exactly 20 years ago, and it was all but abandoned in the government’s most recent budget. The per capita budgets approved for the years 2023 and 2024 are 31% lower than that of 2022. Thus, the state shrank the budgetary security blanket from the “Gaza envelope.”

הפוסט Numbers that Reveal Abandonment: Government Allocations to Local Governments in the “Gaza Envelope” הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

During the current crisis and the lockdown, project participants continued to meet – this time online. Even though most Advisors were sent away on unpaid leave, they continued to speak and consult with one another via ZOOM, WhatsApp and telephone. They supported each other, shared initiatives they are working on, and devised steps designed to have their role defined as vital (in which case they would be called back to work).

At these meetings, the Advisors speak about the need to include women in the decision-making processes taking place in the corona crisis command centers, so that the voices and needs of women from various population groups in the local authority are given voice.

The needs and the initiatives they address include: operating a virtual information center for women, addressing the rise in domestic violence by providing women who opt not to turn to the social welfare department and/or aid centers with the information they need; creating support programs for different groups of women who are alone (older women, divorcees and single mothers) to alleviate loneliness and proffer advice and comfort; providing information pertaining to custody issues and working women´s rights; improving networking between women who own small businesses, and more.

Together, they wrote to the Heads of the Local Authorities, the Director General of the Interior Ministry and the CEO of the Federation of Local Authorities and described their activities. In addition, with Itach-Maaki: Women Lawyers for Social Justice, they petitioned the High Court of Justice to recognize their work as vital and return them to work.

Subsequently, the Interior Ministry acknowledged that Mayoral Advisors on Gender Equality are statutory officials who must be returned to work. This amazing achievement is the result of the impressive teamwork of the Advisors and their collaborations with CSOs. Congratulations to the Advisors!

הפוסט Vital Workers in the Time of Corona הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Arab citizens of Israel, totaling some 20% of the population, are here and there. Here – in pharmacies and in the hospitals located in the center of the country, places receiving a great deal of media attention. There – in the Arab and mixed localities – parts of the same Israel that are nowhere to be seen in primetime.

The health of Arab citizens over there – in the Arab and mixed localities – is not as good as that of Jews. There the Infant mortality rate is double the rate among the Jewish population: 6.0 cases per 1,000 births versus 2.3 among Jews. Life expectancy at birth for Arab citizens is lower than that of Jews: 82.3 for Arab women compared with 85.1 for Jewish women, and 78.0 and 81.7 for Arab and Jewish men, respectively. Arab citizens smoke more than their Jewish counterparts, are they are more prone to obesity, diabetes, stroke, asthma and depression.

Both ¨here¨ and ¨there¨ you can see Arab men and women in the healthcare professions: the most recent data published by the Health Ministry (2015) indicated that 15% of the 25,331 physicians employed in the healthcare field were Arab. The ratio is similar among nurses. The estimate is that 20% of the medical staff in hospitals consists of Arab citizens. Pharmacy has become a field often associated with the Arab population: in 2014, the Health Ministry reported that 42% of pharmacists were Arab, and it is only logical to assume that this figure has increased. In other words, Arab healthcare professionals are on the frontlines of the war against the corona virus.

Since the Arab population is less healthy than the Jewish one, and since Arab healthcare professionals are playing a significant role in the public health system´s fight against corona, one would expect a better coverage of the impact of the disease on Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Arab society is part and parcel of Israeli society and it should be represented and discussed in the daily media reports about the virus that all Israelis follow so closely.

הפוסט What Happened to 20% of Israel’s Citizens? הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Bottom Line:
In 2017, the majority of the settlements (the non-Haredi ones) continued to expend the largest amount per capita: on average, NIS 8,548. They also received the largest designated subsidy from the central government (mainly for education and social welfare) – NIS 3,623 per capita, the largest balance grant – NIS 1,071 per capita and the largest amount in other grants – NIS 459 per capita.

Although there have been changes in government subsidies to local authorities over the past 20 years, still, throughout that period, the largest amounts were channeled to non-Haredi settlements.

The size of the subsidies determines the quality of the services received by residents. The surplus financing of non-Haredi settlements reflects a clear government preference as well as the influence of a strong lobby in the legislature.”

Central Government Subsidies to Local Authorities – Explanation

• Israel’s central government helps to finance a large part of the services provided by local authorities to their residents. In bureaucratic terms, this assistance is referred to as “designated income,” as this subsidy is intended for specific local expenditures, like education, welfare, health and cultural services.
• In addition, the central government extends special assistance to local authorities with few independent sources of income, mainly through what are referred to as “balance grants.”
• Government subsidies are especially important for local authorities with limited resources of their own: while affluent local authorities can finance most services from independent sources of income, this is impossible in local authorities that are devoid of independent income.

A. The per capita expenditure increased in all localities except the Haredi settlements.

1. Between 1997 and 2017, the per capita expenditure grew in all localities, except for the Haredi settlements, in which they decreased by about 4%.

2. In 2017, the highest per capita expenditure among different types of localities was in non-Haredi settlements – NIS 8,548. Not far behind was the group of affluent localities in Israel, with NIS 8,291 per capita. Next were the Jewish development towns, with NIS 7,496. And far behind, the Arab localities, with NIS 5,888. The lowest expenditure per capita was found for Haredi settlements – NIS 4,037.

3. The decrease in per capita expenditure in the Haredi settlements may be explained, in part, by population growth, from 21,000 in 1997 to 128,000 in 2017.

4. During the same period, the greatest increase in per capita expenditure – 45% — occurred in Arab localities. The most significant increase (29%) was in the decade between 1997 and 2007, the years during which a 5-year plan to promote Arab education, referred to as “The 4 Billion Plan,” was implemented.

B. The Lowest Increase in Central Government Subsidy – for Jewish Development Towns

1. In 1997, the central government designated subsidy for non-Haredi settlements – NIS 2,123 per capita – was much higher than that for Haredi settlements – NIS 781 per capita.

2. Two decades later, in 2017, the distinction between Haredi settlements, whose population increased much faster than that of all the other types of localities, and non-Haredi settlements, reveals that the highest designated subsidy per capita still went to the non-Haredi settlements – NIS 3,623, compared to NIS 1,723 in Haredi settlements.

3. In 2017, the designated subsidy in Arab localities was higher than that in Jewish development towns – NIS 3,054, compared with NIS 2,326. The designated subsidy for affluent localities was lower – NIS 2,093 per capita.

4. Between 1997 and 2017, the per capita designated subsidy for Arab localities grew by 133%; that of the Haredi settlements by 121%, that of the non-Haredi settlements by 71% and that of the affluent localities by 66 %. The lowest increase was found for Jewish development towns – only 31 %.

5. The fact that the highest central government designated subsidy in the past as well as in the present went to non-Haredi settlements, helps them to benefit from a budget that is even higher than that of the affluent localities within the Green Line.

6. It is noteworthy that the continued increase in designated subsidies to Arab localities is due to 5-year plans, an increase that comes after years of discrimination and neglect. Still, a report published by Sikkuy in 2005 showed that only 70% of the then allocated sum was actually spent.

C. The central government budget for balance and other grants just returned to its level of two decades ago. The main beneficiaries: non-Haredi settlements and Arab localities.

1. During the financial crisis that followed the second intifadah, the government made steep budget cuts that also affected balance and other types of grants.

2. In 1997, the central government budget for grants to local authorities was NIS 5.33 billion, and in 2000, on the eve of the intifadah, about NIS 6 billion. Following consecutive budget cuts, the budget reached its lowest point in 2014 – NIS 3.85 billion. In 2018, for the first time in two decades, the budget returned to its 2000 level – NIS 6 billion (2018 prices).

3. In 1997, the balance grants to Haredi settlements were similar to those to non-Haredi settlements; however, two decades later the per capita grants to non-Haredi settlements amounted to NIS 1,071, 42% more than that of Haredi settlements – NIS 756.

4. The balance grants going to Jewish development towns in 1997 were similar to those going to Arab localities. In contrast, in 2017 the grants that went to Arab localities amounted to NIS 1,049 per capita, higher by 47% than those that went to Jewish development towns, NIS 715 per capita.

// This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and and the Fund for Middle East Peace. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Adva Center and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the FMEP.

הפוסט Central Government Subsidies of Municipal Budgets, 1997-2017 הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

To illustrate we will compare two Israeli settlement projects: the development towns, established before the Six Day War, and the settlements in the occupied territories, the first of which was set up immediately after that war and became Israel’s major national project after 1977.

From the very start, the promise of development was problematic: the towns were located far from the center of the country, and for years they suffered from lack of economic infrastructure and high unemployment. Instead of serving as urban service centers for their rural surroundings, they lost out in competition with the veteran Kibbutzim and Moshavim.

While the center of the country entered the age of hi-tech, the development towns remained dependent on low tech. The promise inherent in the concept “development” was then superseded by resignation over being stuck in locations far from the center. The mission of development was truncated long before it was realized.

Just as development was disappearing from the development towns and they were becoming the periphery, a new national project was developing in the center of the country: The Settlements.

The first settlements were established immediately after the 1967 war. Twenty years later there were still only about 50,000 settlers. Today the settlers number 600,000, including Israeli residents of the Jerusalem quarters annexed after the war; without them the settlers number 400,000.

In contrast to the development towns, the settlements were not in need of development, as they were located near large cities in the center of the country. Many of the settlements serve as “bedroom communities” for government officials, military personnel, teachers, nurses, social workers and the like.

The amount of money channeled to the development towns was never very great. Infrastructures were poor, as were the public services. In the 1950s and 1960s, the state itself did not have much in its kitty.

The amount of money channeled to the settlements is much greater, among others because when they were set up, the resources of the state were much greater. The settlements are the recipients of generous government budgets: the state assists the settlers, mainly those in “ideological” settlements, with home purchase, by means of convenient mortgages, financing for half of the development costs of construction, exemption from tenders on the land and a discount of about 70% on the value of the land itself. In addition, the government subsidizes education at a higher rate than it does for localities inside the Green Line.

Now we can add another significant difference, which in many senses includes all the rest: the increasing political power of the ideological settlers, as compared with the declining political power of the development towns.

The development towns experienced a political high point in the 1980s and 1990s, when some of their mayors became political celebrities and were elected to the Knesset and appointed to senior positions in government. Since then, they have not been able to replicate that success.

In contrast, the political camp that supports the settlements and their annexation is increasing its power and becoming central in the determination of Israel’s political agenda. This is happening through the growth of political parties belonging to the national religious camp, morphing into “the settler right.” Although these parties represent different social groups holding different positions on civilian matters, the main issue that unites them is preservation of the settlements and advancement of the policy of annexation.

Development towns – and the entire Israeli periphery – never succeeded in attaining such a position, one that would enable it to put development back on the Israeli agenda. Annexation trumps development.

הפוסט Annexation Trumps Start-up Nation הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

הפוסט A Tale of Four Cities הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.