Major Findings –

The Journey to Higher Education

The study points out that despite an increase in the rate of college students of Ethiopian origin, their representation in institutions of higher education is still lower than their representation in the general population, especially when it comes to advanced degrees. The route to higher education, it appears, is still a bumpy one.

Impediments to admission: The proportion of Ethiopian Israelis matriculating is close to that of the general Jewish population of Israel, but only 54% matriculate at a level high enough for admittance to institutes of higher learning, compared with 75% amongst Israeli Jews in general. Nearly all individuals interviewed had to improve their grades (either by retaking the matriculation exam or by enrolling in a pre-academic course of study) before they could be admitted to academia. Many mentioned the psychometric (college entrance) exam as a significant impediment, and indeed, the average grades of Ethiopian Israelis in the exam is lower by some 100 points than the average score of all those who take the entrance exams.

Choice of institution and major: More than four thousand Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in institutes of higher learning, constituting 1.4 % of all students. Relatively few pursue advanced degrees. In addition, they are under-represented at universities (vs colleges); only 24.1% of Ethiopian Israeli students are enrolled in universities, compared with 42.3% of all Jewish students. Regarding field of study, Ethiopian students are over-represented in social studies and administration, law, and auxiliary medical professions. In contrast, they are heavily under-represented in STEM professions, engineering and architecture.

First-generation academicians: All the interviewees in the study were the first generation in their families to receive a college degree; they described feelings of non-belonging and alienation, unfamiliarity with the academic system and significant differences between high school demands and academic demands. Many experienced covert or overt racism, low expectations and often loneliness, especially at universities (as opposed to colleges) and in situations in which they were the only persons from their ethnic background in a course of study. Their drop-out rate is relatively high — 25%, compared with 15% for Jewish students as a whole.

Economic hardship and its effect on studies: Most of the interviewees experienced ongoing economic hardship and needed to devote considerable time to work while studying, which often caused delays in completion of their degrees. Economic hardship also affected their choice of where to enroll; some chose the colleges that best enabled them to combine employment and study; however, that choice limited their possibilities of study and later employment.

Employment and integration difficulties: In 2020, only 0.6% of academicians in Israel were Ethiopian Israelis. The figure is low due to the small number of college graduates in the Ethiopian community, as well as to the difficulty of finding employment suitable to their expertise. Among those with bachelor’s degrees, only 18% worked in their fields, compared with 45% among the general population. Some interviewees expanded on how hard it was to translate their education into employment opportunities compatible with their education.

Academicians of Ethiopian origin are concentrated in economic sectors and occupations in which salaries are relatively low, in most cases lower than those of other minority groups. As such, they can be said to pay an “ethnic fine” – discrimination based on ethnic origin. There are many economic sectors in which hardly any Ethiopian Israelis are to be found, while their presence is significant in others — the public sector, health services, manufacturing and maintenance services.

Glass ceiling in the public sector: Despite the increase in representation of Ethiopian Israelis in the public services and local government, most occupy low-level positions and are under-represented in senior positions.

“Hyper visibility,” racism and stereotypes: High visibility intensifies differences in the workplace, as ethnic identity becomes the central factor regarding the worker, overshadowing skill, contribution and individual characteristics. The most salient phenomenon described by most of the interviewees was covert but consistent racism, reflected in lack of confidence in their professional abilities and in increased demands to prove their competence.

The culture of the Ethiopian community as an impediment, for example how hard it was to stand out and to market themselves “aggressively” as other Israelis do. Some defined theirs as “a culture of modesty” that limits one’s ability to dwell on their achievements and demand promotion.

The absence of employment networks and the types of connections needed for landing a job; the method of “friend brings friend” leaves Ethiopian Israelis out in the cold, especially in a situation in which very few Ethiopian Israelis occupy senior positions.

Affirmative action and organizational diversity: Despite awareness of the necessity of these employment strategies for increasing the presence of Ethiopian Israelis in senior positions and facilitating promotion, some mentioned that they might also act as a double-edged sword that reproduces labeling as a separate and inferior group.

The interviewees evinced determination to fight and not give up despite racism and discrimination. Strategies included refusing to work in hostile environments, even resigning to avoid them; viewing their own success as contributing to a change in the negative image of the community; directly confronting racist expressions, either with humor or aggression; or just ignoring or belittling unpleasant occurrences.

When asked what their recommendations were for young Ethiopian Israelis regarding education and employment, the main recommendations of most of the interviewees were “Get yourself a profession!” and “You will need to work twice as hard!”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Education

• Invest in improving the results of the matriculation exams of Ethiopian Israelis.
• Provide tutoring for college entrance exams.
• Direct prospective students to quality institutions and to professions for which there is demand.
• Expand economic assistance so that it includes living grants, especially for students enrolled at universities.

The Labor Market and the Public Sector

• Focus representation policy on promoting Ethiopian Israelis to senior positions in the public service and local government.
• Create clear lines of promotion and include Ethiopian Israelis in committees putting out tenders for senior positions.

Employers, Training and Employment Programs

• Raise the awareness of employers of the economic as well as the social advantages of diversity.
• Train personnel managers in diversity and inclusive work environments.
• Harness large and medium-sized employers to initiate diversity projects, with the involvement of the Ministry of Labor.
• Expand the “LaMerhak” career planning program for academicians, with an emphasis on students in colleges majoring in either the humanities or social studies.
• Promote the integration of Ethiopian Israelis into hi-tech industries and the education system.

The full research paper is available in Hebrew here (PDF).

הפוסט “You will need to work twice as hard”: From Higher Education to the Labor Market – The Trials and Tribulations of Ethiopian Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

An infographic presentation based on a study by the Adva Center in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on gender pay gaps in Israel.

הפוסט Why Is Women’s Pay Lower Than Men’s? Infographic Presentation הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

As the report itself states, this is hurtful employment: persons employed on an hourly basis earn less than those paid by the month, they have significantly fewer social benefits and it is easy to let them go.

The report is especially relevant today, as the compensation for workers adversely affected by Israel’s war with Iran is based on that implemented during the Gazan war and Corona epidemic, which neglects workers employed by the hour. In cases in which their working hours were reduced, they were not eligible for any compensation.

The median hourly pay for workers employed by the hour is NIS 48, compared with NIS 85 for workers employed on a monthly basis. Some 55% of workers employed by the hour have full-time jobs (defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics as at least 35 hours a week), and their salaries — NIS 46 per hour — are even lower than the average for workers employed part time. Moreover, in all the occupations included in the report that include a large percentage of workers paid by the hour, the workers earn less than workers paid by the month.

The highest proportion of workers paid by the hour can be found among waiters and barmen – 92%. As these are occupations in which mostly young people and students are employed and they involve high turnover, pay by the hour may be justified. However, other occupations in which hourly pay is common do not involve young, temporary workers and high turnover. The reference is to nursing care workers, most of them older women, 80% of whom are paid by the hour; cleaners, (75% of them employed by contrastors and paid by hour); transport and storage workers, mostly men, 70% of whom are paid by the hour; salespersons (66% paid hourly), as well as 60% of salesclerks in stores and 56% of nursery school aides.

Employment by the hour is justified as “flexible employment”. However, due to the extent of its usage, it has become a common method of employment that involves low wages and avoids the payment of proper workplace social rights. As expected, it is utilized for workers with low bargaining power, most of whom have a low level of education and are devoid of occupational skills — workers that include a high representation of Arabs and young people (23% of each). However, hourly employment is not limited to these social groups: Amongst hourly employees, 34% are parents of children up to the age of 14. This constitutes a huge proportion of wage earners working without employment security or a fixed number of hours.

Finally, the employment sectors in which hourly pay has taken root are also characterized by difficulties in recruiting workers – among them nursing care workers and teaching aides. These employees vote with their feet, frequently seeking more stable employment. Thus, public services suffer as well as employers, as the latter forego employment stability in favor of the financial gain they expect from cheap labor.

As it turns out, the situation is dismal: Employment by the hour has become a widely used method for simply reducing the cost of labor.  It is harmful, exploitative and unethical, and in the long run not necessarily economically advantageous. Due to the frequency of the use of employment by the hour, it is high time for Israel to pass a law limiting it to part-time or temporary jobs.

הפוסט Employment by the Hour is Harmful Employment הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

These are the trends behind the phenomenon of low-wage employment. The present study examines the trends vis-à-vis such employment in recent years, as well as the characteristics of the workers themselves. The study was undertaken in view of the high percentage, in international comparison, of low-wage workers in Israel, the increase in the proportion of working families living in poverty, and the reduction of remuneration for work.

Low-wage work is not an inevitable phenomenon, and there are steps that can be taken to reduce its prevalence, as recommended by the OECD. These include periodically increasing the minimum wage,  buttressing public investment in active labor policies, strengthening government enforcement of workplace laws, and encouraging unionization, especially in the private sector.

Main Findings

• In 2021-22, 23.3% of employed persons worked for low wages – the highest proportion since 2015 (with the exception of 2020, the year of the Corona epidemic) and one of the highest proportions among OECD countries.

• Looking at gender, the proportion of women working for low pay is twice that of men – 31.5% compared with 15.9%.

• Throughout the period examined (2015-2021-22), there was an improvement in the situation of workers from peripheral areas, workers employed full-time, and workers who immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union. In contrast, the situation of Arab women and men, Haredi men, and workers aged 65 and over deteriorated.

• With regard to occupational sectors, the chances of unskilled workers and individuals employed in sales and services of being employed at low wages was extremely high, and those of skilled workers in both manufacturing and agriculture was also considerable.

• The increase in the proportion of workers with low wages occurred in tandem with the continuing reduction in the share of workers’ income in the national income pie. In 2024, the workers’ share was 56%, the lowest share in 25 years, in contrast to the share of employers, which reached a high of 24% — compared with 18% in 2000. This trend points to the increase in the profitability of employers, at the expense of the paychecks of employees.

• The social groups with the largest proportion of low-income workers include disabled persons, Arab women and men, Haredi women and workers of pension age. Among these groups, the proportion of low-income workers is over 40%.

• A multivariate analysis reveals that the size of the position (full-time, half-time, etc.) is the strongest variable influencing the chances of an individual’s working for a low wage. Controlling for position size and other variables, the chances of women to work for low wages is more than 70% greater than that of men.

הפוסט Work Without Decent Pay in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The part of the program earmarked for increasing the integration of Arab youth (aged 18-35) into the job market, budgeted at 1.4 billion shekels over the 5-year period, focuses on two groups:  young men and women with high school educations or less, and young women with academic or other post-high school educations. To date, the program has initiated quality professional guidance, professional training, Hebrew language skills improvement, encouragement to work in high-tech, and the provision of incentives to employers to hire Arabs.[4]

Preliminary figures indicate that the program is succeeding; therefore, it is crucial to continue it in order to realize the potential of young Arab men and women.

According to Sami Miaari and Arnon Barak,[5]  there has been an improvement in the employment rate of Arab women in Israel, which on the eve of the present war was 44.8%, among others, due to the 5-year plan. However, that rate is lower than the employment rate of non-Haredi Jewish women — 83.2% in 2022.[6] As for Arab men, in 2023, their employment rate rose beyond the goal set for 2026. However,  that rate is expected to grow more slowly in the future, to 79% by 2030. As such, it is not expected to achieve the goal set by the government  (prediction by Miaari and Barak). [7] Thus, without continued financing of the program, the achievement will be even lower.

Employment Rates of Arab Men and Women, 2019 and 2023, and 2020 Goals of the 5-year Plan[8]

Budget cuts in the Employment Program for Arab women and men will result in perpetuating the gaps between Jews and Arabs; they also augur damage to the Israeli economy, especially in light of the reduction in the employment of Arabs since the outbreak of the war.[9]

Employment gaps between Arabs and Jews in Israel are significant. In 2021, the average wage of Arab men was 64% of the average wage of Jewish men, while the average wage of Arab women was 67% that of Jewish women.[10] This can be partially explained by the fact that Arabs’ representation in high-paying branches of the economy is very low. A prime example is the hi-tech industry, in which no more than 2% of employed Arab men were to be found in 2019, compared with 64% of employed non-Haredi Jewish men.[11]

The integration of Arabs into the employment market will improve the Israeli economy, as two-thirds of the growth potential of the GDP has been attributed to an increase in employment.[12]  Thus,  a rise in the total employment of Arab citizens and the quality of that employment will contribute both to the growth of the Israeli economy and to the narrowing of gaps in employment rates between Israel and other OECD countries.

הפוסט Arab Society in Israel and the Israeli Economy Will Be Weakened by the Proposed Budget Cuts in Employment Programs for Arab Citizens הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Recently the Government Employment Service published figures on persons released on leave without pay or unemployed during the month of October.

According to that publication, in October, there were 42,400 new employment seekers, due to their having been sent on leave without pay, 59% of them women; it appears that women will feel the brunt of changes in the labour market resulting from the war more than men. An examination of the occupations in which large numbers of persons were released on leave without pay makes this phenomenon clear. Those are occupations in which women constitute the majority: salespersons and service providers (53% women), caregivers and assistants in the area of healthcare (87%), and managers in the area of administrative services (51% women).[i]

Among the occupations which the publication stated had the highest likelihood of being released on leave without pay in the near future were employees in the area of personal services, among them distinctly female occupations: cosmeticians, hairdressers and beauty salon workers, as well as salespersons and customer service  people — most of these female occupations.[ii]

Being sent on leave without pay costs the employee. Employment compensation for young people up to age 28, who constitute a large group of persons on leave without pay, is between 70% and 80% of salary for low earners, about 60 % of salary for persons with average pay, and about 40% for persons with high salaries.[iii]

Women constitute the majority among persons paid by the hour, especially in caregiving occupations, and as such they are more likely to have their hours and pay cut, and if sent on leave without pay their social rights are also diminished: pension savings, sick leave, vacation pay.

Not only that: severance pay packages do not apply to parents of children up to the age of 14 and children with special needs that were absent from work due to the closure or partial operation of schools: this in accordance with the instructions of the Home Front Command. In some localities, like Netivoth, Beer Sheba, Ofakim and Ashkelon, no frontal teaching has taken place since the beginning of hostilities. As women are the main caregivers of children and earn, on average, less than men, it is reasonable to assume that women are more likely to remain at home with the children than men.

The problem is especially acute in the private sector, in economic branches whose income has been adversely affected by the war situation. In such cases, the employer is unable to afford salary expenses, and the burden falls on parents who use their paid vacation days to stay home with the children or, if they have already used them up, absent themselves from work without pay. In such a situation, they become more vulnerable to a reduction in their working hours or to layoffs.

References:

[i] Central Bureau of Statistics. Manpower Survey 2020. Table 2.18. Figures are for 2019.

ii] Ibid.

[iii] National Insurance Institute. Table of Unemployment Compensation.

הפוסט In Times of Crisis, Women’s Employment is More Precarious than Men’s הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The nature of socio-economic data is that they become known with the passage of time – some after a few months and others after a year or two or more. In the meantime, the latest socioeconomic data for Israel published by state institutions – the Bank of Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the National Insurance Institute (NII) – are, at best, for 2021, while some are for 2020 and others for 2019.

And during those years, we were subject to another worldwide crisis with socio-economic implications – the Corona epidemic. That epidemic, which has yet to run its course, though it was shunted to the margins of the news by the sights and sounds of the Russian war against the Ukraine, caused the death of millions, the closure of numerous businesses, unemployment rates unknown since the 1929 crash, as well as huge government outlays for aid to individuals and businesses and, of course, on health.

At the same time there were individuals who not only were not adversely affected during the Corona crisis, but actually profited.

This was the case of the ten richest persons in the world, whose combined worth prior to the epidemic stood at 700 billion dollars, a sum that had doubled by 2022 to 1.5 trillion dollars.

Israel’s wealthy partake of the same phenomenon: according to the financial newspaper “The Marker,” the wealth of the 500 richest persons in Israel quadrupled over the last four years and grew by 32% between 2020 and 2021.

The figures presented below reflect the first chapters of the story of the epidemic, which is also a story of the widening of inequality in Israel and elsewhere. This, in hope that the war currently raging in eastern Europe ends quickly and will not become the main story of Israel: A Social Report next year.

הפוסט Israel – A Social Report 2022: The Inequality Epidemic Still Rages הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

I beg to differ with the Alternative Prime Minister and with all others sounding the hi-tech jive: what Israel needs more than more hi-tech is more help-tech.

Once the country with the highest number of physicians per 1,000 people –  4 per 1,000 people, Israel now boasts 3.13 (compared with the average of 3.6 in OECD countries). According to TheMarker (March 3, 2022), the future looks dim: the prediction is that 30% (583) of an estimated 1,932 medical school graduates to be licensed to practice in 2022 received their degrees from medical schools abroad whose diplomas will soon lose their recognition, due to the unacceptably low level of the medical education and the paucity of the clinical experience they offer.

Israel needs more doctors now, and the needs will grow with the population. And nurses? Anyone who has ever been in hospital knows that nurses are the professionals who actually take care of you. But they are few and far between: Israel has only 5 practising nurses per 1,000 people, compared with an average of about 9  per thousand – almost double — in OECD countries. Unlike physicians, some 40% of whom are women, nurses do not make news (84% are women).

Doctors and nurses are not the only help-tech (and other public service) professions we read and hear about day in and day out: there is a shortage of some 10,000 teachers and some 10,000 psychologists, as well as 20,000 care workers for the elderly.

In the public services, there is a dearth of positions for social workers — sorely felt during the corona crisis of the last two years. And other help-tech workers, like physical therapists, dieticians, speech therapists and occupational therapists, are also in short supply in the public services.

One of the reasons for the shortage of help-tech workers is that salaries are low, especially relative to hi-tech workers. And the majority of nurses, teachers, psychologists, social workers and physical, speech, and occupational therapists are women.

It is no secret that women’s salaries do not equal those of men, among others, because the majority of women work in occupations that underpay them; that is, there is no connection between their pay and their social worth.

No, what Israel needs more than more hi-tech workers is more help-tech workers, more positions for help-tech workers in the public services, and higher salaries that will not discourage women (as well as men) from entering and remaining in the help-tech professions. In the long as well as the short run, our quality of life depends more on help-tech than on hi-tech.

הפוסט More Hi-Tech ? What Israel Really Needs is More Help-Tech הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

Israel’s top one percent received the most expeditious state protection and benefits. The Bank of Israel supported big corporations by purchasing 15 billion NIS worth of corporate bonds. This aid contributed to the fact that while the real economy shrunk, the Tel Aviv 90 Index increased by some 18% in value during the first year of the corona epidemic.

The government exempted the wealthy from the burden of participation in financing the costs of the corona crisis. Israel expended an estimated NIS 137.3 million on aid to businesses and citizens. As this sum was not budgeted, it increased the budgetary deficit and the national debt. The Netanyahu-Gantz coalition did not consider raising taxes, despite Bank of Israel declarations that tax increases were unavoidable.

If tax increases are not imposed on the wealthy, such increases will either fall to the lot of the middle class or, alternatively, result in the privatization or reduction of public services – moves that will hurt middle and low-income families. In light of these possibilities, the report recommends imposing a wealth tax.

Hi Tech in Times of Corona: Like its ultra-rich, Israel’s hi tech sector has not been adversely affected by the corona epidemic. In fact, the hi tech sector continued to grow despite the corona crisis. For example, the financial newspaper The Marker reported in January 2021 that “the 13,500 hi tech workers employed in the ten largest technology companies listed on the stock exchange gained no less than 2.5 million dollars in income.”

Small Businesses in Times of Corona: Small businesses are the main reason for the increase in employment in the Israeli economy that occurred over the past two decades and the concomitant decrease in unemployment. While the businesses in question are small, together they constitute the largest employer in the Israeli economy. In 2018, small and medium sized businesses accounted for 1.92 million employee posts, or 60% of the 3.17 million posts in the private sector.

Small businesses were the main losers in the corona crisis, primarily service providers, many of whom had become upwardly mobile due to increased consumption in the decades preceding the crisis. In 2020, private per capita consumption in Israel decreased by 11.1%, more than the average in OECD countries – 6.3%.

Dun and Bradstreet estimated that in the first half of 2020, 37,600 Israeli businesses shut down, among them 1,550 restaurants, bars and coffee shops; more than 1,000 construction and renovation firms; some 600 transportation companies; and 450 clothing shops. Their estimate was that by the end of the year, 80-85 thousand businesses would close down – an increase of 85% over 2019.

The chief economist of the Israel Ministry of Finance estimated in May 2020 that 54% of workers furloughed were employed in small businesses.

Food Insecurity in Times of Corona: The highest proportion of persons reporting food insecurity during the corona epidemic was found among Arab citizens of Israel. In April 2020, 23.5% of Arabs reported that they or members of their family had reduced the amount of food or the number of meals during the previous week, compared with 14.1 % among persons in the general population of Israel aged 21 and over.

Inequality in Health in Times of Corona: Israelis of low socio-economic status sickened more than Israelis of high socio-economic status, among other things due to the higher incidence of health risk factors like high blood pressure and diabetes among them.

The corona epidemic threatens everyone, but the threat is especially acute for persons whose living conditions promote contagion. Housing density and household size are larger among Haredi Jews and Arab citizens of Israel than among others, resulting in greater susceptibility to infection from the virus.

Another factor influencing the rate of illness from the corona virus is the sense of alienation of these same two population groups from the central government of Israel and its institutions, resulting in indifference or non-compliance with official instructions issued as to how to keep safe from contagion.

The result: the death rate of Arab citizens of Israel aged 60 and older from the corona virus was three times that of non-Haredi Jews; and the death rate of Haredi Jews four times that of non-Haredi Jews.

Mental Health in Times of Corona: The corona epidemic has had an adverse effect on the mental health of Israelis. During the first lockdown, about one-third (34%) of persons aged 21 years and over suffered from tension and anxiety. That proportion rose to 42% when the lockdown was lifted in July 2020. In November 2020 the proportion decreased to 37% — still quite high. Those reporting the greatest suffering from tension and anxiety were women and Arab citizens.

Feelings of loneliness and depression were revealed by the Citizen Resilience Survey conducted by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, which showed that in April 2020, 30% of interviewees aged 65 and over reported loneliness and 19% reported depression, compared with 24% and 16%, respectively in the general population.

Housing in Times of Corona: Before the outbreak of the epidemic (2018), Israeli households from the bottom income decile living in rental housing expended 54% of their disposable income on rent and related outlays. For households in the second lowest income decile, that expenditure constituted 34% of their disposable income; in both cases, housing expenditure was higher than the 30% considered the maximum households should have to pay for housing. The economic hardships of the epidemic for households residing in rented housing led to an increase in requests for rent assistance, along with an increase in the number of eligible households waiting for public housing units.

While the economic crisis accompanying the corona epidemic had an adverse effect on renters as well as on home owners with mortgage payments to meet, the benefits given by the government in the area of housing were directed not to them but rather to persons purchasing housing units as investments. With the expressed purpose of stimulating business in the real estate sector by incentivizing investors,  in July 2020 the purchase tax for investors was reduced, thus abrogating the increase made in 2015 to discourage real estate investments in favor of the purchase of own homes.

The full report is available in Hebrew here

// The report was produced in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, with support from MAZON: A Jewish Response to Hunger and The New Israel Fund

הפוסט Social Report 2021 – Corona: Epidemic of Inequality הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.

The interest in examining the role of women rises, amongst other reasons, from the connection between the filmmakers to the types of content we are exposed to on screen (the artwork). The presence and absence of women from key roles in the film industry impact the types of narratives, topics, characters, and points of view presented on screen. The contents and representations we are exposed to have a tremendous significance in building our personal as well as our social identity and in shaping the reality around us; their importance cannot be overstated – especially in a world dominated by screens.

The report is presented in a way which reflects a certain chronology of the development of a cinematic career, beginning with students’ graduation films, through debut narrative features to full-length narrative features.

We will examine women’s presence in key roles when making full-length narrative features and take a closer look at these five key roles – scriptwriting, directing, production, cinematography, and editing. We will also look at publicly funded students’ graduation films; the available resources of public funding granted to women and men filmmakers between 2013-2018 through the analysis of the overall grant applications and grants allocated to filmmakers by Israel’s two major film funds, and their support of full-length narrative features – The Israel Film Fund and The Rabinovich Foundation – Israel Cinema Project. It is important to mention that this report only examines the two funds specified, and not the entire pool of public funding sources.

We will conduct a gender-based analysis of the Israeli Academy of Film and Television Awards – Ophir Awards, and Israeli Documentary Film Competition as a reflection of the local filmmaking industry in terms of cinematic yield, professional recognition, and publicity. Lastly, we will present information regarding women filmmakers from social minority groups as well as recommendations for a gender based analysis and the means by which to strengthen women in the film industry.

With the exception of the students’ graduation films, the Ophir Awards and the Israeli Documentary Film Competition, this report only examines the processes of making full-length narrative features screened across Israeli cinemas. The reason is that the sources this report draws on regarding documentary films are incomplete, mainly due to the fact that documentary films get far less screenings in mainstream cinemas.

// Lior Elefant is a Ph.D. candidate at the Sociology and Anthropology department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Her research, supervised by Prof. Nitza Berkovich, deals with gender inequality in the Israeli film industry.

The report was published in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and The Directors’ Guild.

הפוסט The Celluloid Ceiling: A Gender-Based Analysis of The Israeli Film Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-Adva Center.